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Abstract
Despite average per-capita consumption of roughly $1 per day, many Tanzanian house-
holds do not take advantage of bulk discounts for staple goods. Using transaction
diaries covering nearly 57,000 purchases by 1,499 households over two weeks, we find
that through bulk purchasing the average household could spend 8.9% less on ob-
served quantities (or consume 15.6% more at observed expenditure). We investigate
several explanations for the observed purchasing patterns, and find evidence consistent
with inattention, worries about over-consumption, avoidance of social taxation, and
coordination problems. Contrary to prior work, we find little evidence that liquidity
constraints prevent poor households from bulk purchasing.
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1 Introduction
In Tanzania, average consumption per-capita is in the range of $1 per day. At such low
levels, the marginal value of additional consumption is very high. For this reason, we ex-
pect households in Tanzania and in other low-income countries to be especially mindful of
opportunities to raise consumption through careful management of purchasing behavior.
In this paper we study the surprising, contrary finding that many households purchase
non-perishable goods in small increments, multiple times, over a two-week period. If price
schedules were linear and transaction costs minimal, frequent purchasing in small increments
would have no impact on the budget set. We show, however, that many goods exhibit
bulk discounts over commonly realized values of the quantity support. As a result, many
households suffer significant financial losses (or, equivalently, substantial reductions in their
consumption) in order to maintain a pattern of frequent, small-quantity purchases.
We have two main goals in this paper. First, we carefully document the existence
of bulk discounts in markets in Tanzania, and quantify the financial losses that households
incur (or the quantity of consumption forgone) by not taking advantage of these bulk dis-
counts. Second, we empirically investigate why households do not take advantage of bulk
discounts. Here, we focus on both traditional explanations—such as liquidity constraints,
or fear of social taxation—and more behavioral explanations—such as inattention, or self-
control problems. In this respect our paper builds on a small but important literature in
development economics, which is focused primarily on understanding whether liquidity con-
straints prevent poor households from buying in bulk (Rao, 2000; Attanasio and Frayne,
2006; Gibson and Kim, 2011; Mussa, 2015; Attanasio and Pastorino, 2015), and on a larger
literature in marketing and economics that studies questions of consumer choice in the face of
bulk discounts in high-income countries (Frank, Douglas and Polli, 1967; Kunreuther, 1973;
Wansink, 1996; Chung and Myers, 1999; Bray, Loomis and Engelen, 2009; Griffith et al.,
2009; Beatty, 2010; Orhun and Palazzolo, 2016).
In Section 2, we motivate our analysis with a simple example that illustrates how
making frequent purchases in small quantities is financially inefficient when there are bulk
discounts. We further use this example to delineate a variety of explanations for why a
household might still choose to make frequent small-quantity purchases, despite incurring
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these losses. That discussion previews the possible explanations that we formally investigate
later in the paper. We then develop our empirical framework. In particular, we describe how
we use observed purchases at focal quantities—frequently observed quantities—to estimate
a market expenditure schedule, e∗i (q), for every item i. This schedule returns the amount
one must spend to purchase quantity q of item i in a single transaction. The financial cost
of small-quantity purchasing comes from comparing observed expenditure over two weeks
to the estimated cost of purchasing the total observed quantity all in one purchase (using
e∗i (q)). In making these calculations, we project each observed transaction onto the market
expenditure schedule, to ensure that the measure of financial losses is driven entirely by a
failure to take advantage of bulk discounts, not by whether a particular transaction is a good
or bad deal conditional on the quantity purchased.
We describe our data set in Section 3. The data come from the Survey of Household
Welfare and Labour in Tanzania (SHWALITA), a consumption survey conducted in 2007-
2008. We use a subset of the SHWALITA data, consisting of transaction diaries maintained
by 1,499 households from 168 villages in 7 districts. For two weeks, these households recorded
every purchase, gift, sale, or change in stocks, for all goods. We focus on the nearly 57,000
recorded purchases of 22 items that are non-perishable over the relevant ranges of quantities
and time. We use the text descriptions of each transaction to ensure that the item definitions
are highly standardized. For example, we restrict the “Beans” category to include only one
specific type of kidney bean that is effectively standardized across Tanzania; we restrict the
“Dried sardines” category to a specific type of small fish called dagaa that has a shelf life
of many months; and so on. The set of items in the study includes numerous staple goods,
such as kerosene, cooking oil, maize, flour, cassava, beans, rice, onions, and dried sardines.1
Frequent purchasing is commonplace—among households that purchase an item, the average
number of purchase transactions is 3.6 over two weeks.
In Section 4, we turn to our first main goal: carefully documenting the existence
of bulk discounts, and quantifying the financial losses (or forgone consumption) from not
taking advantage of these discounts. We first show in data from market price surveys that
bulk discounts are present within district, within village, and even within vendor. Using
1We have been careful to ensure that our results are robust to concerns about perishability. See Section
3 for a description of item selection, and Section 4.2 for a discussion of the shelf life of items relative to the
required storage time to justify bulk purchasing.
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focal quantities and prices from the transaction diaries to estimate e∗i (q) at the district level,
we then find bulk discounts for 82 of the 146 item-district pairs. Some items exhibit bulk
discounts in all seven districts, others in a subset of the districts. One item, brewed tea, does
not exhibit bulk discounts anywhere.2 We also show in Section 4 that when bulk discounts
exist, the lowest unit price is available at a quantity equivalent to roughly a week’s worth
of consumption, on average. This highlights a key feature of the setting: the discounts here
are from buying a small bottle’s worth of cooking oil instead of a scoopful (for example),
not from buying many months’ worth of an item at the equivalent of a big box store in the
US. Hence, although our observation window is two weeks, our results do not require that
households store items for that long.
We find that households appear to be sacrificing a substantial amount of consumption
by not taking advantage of bulk discounts. Across items purchased multiple times in the
two-week study period, the value of forgone consumption is equal to 8.9% of the value of
expenditure. In other words, the average household could spend nearly 9% less on a range
of important goods without reducing consumption.3 This average value masks significant
heterogeneity. Approximately 8% of households have zero forgone consumption, while a
quarter could reduce expenditure by over 10% without reducing quantity purchased. If we
take the alternative approach of holding expenditure constant and calculating the counter-
factual quantities that could be purchased by buying all at once, we find ever larger average
values. Households could purchase 33% more kerosene, 50% more cooking bananas, 26%
more cooking oil, 46% more onions, 28% more dried sardines – surprisingly large amounts
for goods that are part of daily life in Tanzanian villages.
In Section 5, we address our second main goal: investigating why households fail
to take advantage of bulk discounts. Recent papers have shown how seemingly inexplicable
behavior by individuals in developing countries can be understood by either gathering better
information about the setting (Baland, Guirkinger and Mali, 2011; Stephens and Barrett,
2There is a longstanding literature on the estimation of demand elasticities for consumer goods in develop-
ing countries (Deaton, 1988; Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Deaton, Friedman and Alatas, 2004; McKelvey,
2011). That literature focuses on the problem of using unit values from aggregate data to proxy for prices,
because transaction-level data like ours is rarely available. Those papers do not allow for bulk discounts, as
identification usually requires assuming linear prices at the local level.
3This should not be thought of as a 9% return on a two-week investment, which could be re-invested for
annualized return of over 900%. The implicit return to the household is limited by the amount of food it
can consume. Hence, the expected savings over the course of an entire year is still 9%.
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2011; Zeitlin, 2011; Burke, 2014), or expanding the class of admissible explanations to include
those grounded in models that allow for psychological biases or cognitive costs (Ashraf,
Karlan and Yin, 2006; Duflo, Kremer and Robinson, 2011; Dupas and Robinson, 2013; Mani
et al., 2013; Kremer et al., 2013; Jack and Smith, 2015; Kremer et al., 2015). We borrow from
both approaches, and consider a wide range of both rational and behavioral mechanisms.
We first focus on explanations that we conclude are not playing a major role in driving
the losses that we estimate. The hypotheses that we reject are the following: binding liquidity
constraints prevent households from buying in bulk; people enjoy going to the market and
shopping; it is costly to store or transport bulk quantities; and, consumers are not aware
of bulk discounts. Evidence against these hypotheses comes primarily from the rejection of
necessary conditions, through a combination of parametric and non-parametric arguments.
Our finding that losses are not driven by liquidity constraints is particularly important
relative to the prior literature on this question, which has largely found that an inability to
take advantage of bulk discounts leads the poor to pay more for consumption (Rao, 2000;
Attanasio and Frayne, 2006; Gibson and Kim, 2011; Mussa, 2015; Attanasio and Pastorino,
2015). The primary evidence against this hypothesis comes from conducting counterfactual
exercises similar to those in Mullainathan and Shafir (2013). Using the observed time path of
expenditures at the household-item level, we ask: how many days would a household have to
delay buying an item before it had accumulated sufficient savings to buy in bulk (after which
it could do so in perpetuity, if a liquidity constraint is the problem)? We find average delays
of less than a week, across the wealth distribution. If we allow for households to finance the
bulk purchase of a staple item by temporarily foregoing the purchase of non-essentials (sugar,
tea, etc.), the median delay to the bulk purchase is 1.3 days across all households, and it is
3.2 days for even the poorest subset of the households that are the least financially efficient
purchasers. Hence, while there may be a handful of households for whom an undetectable
liquidity constraint makes it difficult to buy in bulk, this is clearly not case for the vast
majority of households in our sample.
Next, we focus on explanations for which we find supportive evidence. First, while
we conclude that households are surely aware of the available discounts, loss-prone house-
holds (those that frequently forego bulk discounts) seem to be inattentive to the financial
implications of not buying in bulk. Accounting for both household and item fixed effects,
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loss-prone households do not reduce the number of purchase transactions on items with bulk
discounts, whereas other households do. Second, we find evidence that households make
frequent purchases as a way to ration consumption, perhaps due to worries that they will
consume large stocks more quickly than they would like. This finding is based on the anal-
ysis of shopping patterns for “temptation goods”, which we identified through a separate
survey effort in Tanzania. Third, we find evidence that households might purchase in small
quantities in order to avoid social taxation—in the form of friends, family, and neighbors
consuming a portion of their stocks (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Platteau, 2006; Goldberg,
2016; Baland, Guirkinger and Mali, 2011; Alby, Auriol and Nguimkeu, 2013; Jakiela and
Ozier, 2016). In fact, because we observe flows of both incoming and outgoing resources,
we can construct a proxy measure of each household’s social tax rate, and examine the re-
lationship between social taxes and bulk purchasing. Finally, we find evidence that losses
are larger in households that seem to have a harder time coordinating their purchases, as
proxied by the number of times that two members of the same household purchase the same
item on the same day. This finding suggests that each household member makes purchases
in small quantities as a kind of hedge against the possibility that another household member
is purchasing the same item.
Finally, in Section 6, we discuss some broader implications of our analysis. We high-
light that household purchasing behavior seems driven by multiple mechanisms. Moreover,
these mechanisms might interact with each other in important ways, and operate differently
across different households. We also discuss possible policy implications.
2 Conceptual framework
In this section, we develop a conceptual framework that underlies our empirical analysis.
We begin with a stylized, motivating example of bulk discounts. We then build upon this
example to introduce our approach to the data.
2.1 Motivating example
Suppose that, in a particular district, rice is sold in three quantities: 1 kg for 1000 TZS;
2 kg for 1600 TZS; and 4 kg for 2400 TZS. Note the existence of bulk discounts: the unit
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(per-kg) price is 1000 TZS for the 1 kg purchase, 800 TZS for 2 kg, and 600 TZS for 4 kg.
A household that wishes to consume 4 kg of rice over two weeks has (at least) three
options: purchase a 4 kg bag and consume it over the two weeks; purchase a 2 kg bag,
consume it over the first week, then purchase another 2 kg bag at the start of the second
week; or purchase a 1 kg bag four times over the course of the two weeks. From a purely
financial perspective, purchasing the 4 kg in a single transaction—buying in bulk—is most
efficient. Yet, we will see that many households do not always purchase in bulk.
Suppose we observe a household that purchases a 1 kg bag on four occasions over
the two weeks. This raises two questions. First, how large are the losses incurred from not
buying in bulk? Second, why might this household be willing to incur the loss?
In our stylized example, the answer to the first question is straightforward. We can
calculate a financial loss by taking household expenditure on the 4 kg of rice (4000 TZS) and
subtracting the cost of purchasing the entire 4 kg in bulk (2400 TZS). Hence, this household
incurred a financial loss of 1600 TZS for rice. Alternatively, we can calculate a quantity
loss by taking the total amount spent (4000 TZS), calculating the quantity that could have
been purchased had that entire amount been spent at the lowest per-unit price (62
3
kg at 600
TZS per kg), and subtracting the quantity the household actually purchased (4 kg). Hence,
this household incurred a quantity loss of 22
3
kg. With some minor adjustments, this is the
approach that we take in the data (see the next subsection for details).
Turning to the second question, there are a number of reasons a household might
choose not to buy in bulk despite the financial cost entailed. To foreshadow our analysis in
Section 5, here we provide a brief overview of the hypotheses we will consider. These hy-
potheses arose from three sources: discussions with individuals and focus groups in Tanzania
(described in Section 3), our own hypothesizing based on the literature or our knowledge of
the context, and suggestions from colleagues or seminar participants.
The first set of possible factors relates to the full cost of getting goods from the
market to the house. A natural concern in Tanzania is that the household may be liquidity
constrained. If household members are living on day-to-day wage earnings, have minimal
savings, and must satisfy a range of consumption needs, they may not be able to spend
2400 TZS on rice in a single purchase. This theme is prominent in existing work on bulk
discounts. Another possibility is that there are other costs associated with bulk purchasing,
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e.g. transport costs, storage costs, or expected losses to depreciation. A full accounting of
such costs might show that the bulk purchase is not optimal.
A second set of possibilities revolves around the way that goods are consumed. Prior
evidence suggests that in sub-Saharan Africa, wealth is subject to a high rate of “social
taxation” in the form of friends and relatives asking for handouts or coming over for meals.
Pressure to distribute resources among social networks may be particularly significant for
visible goods such stores of staple items. In our example, if the household buys in bulk,
friends and relatives may notice the large bag of rice and be more inclined to ask for a loan
or to eat a meal at the house. Relatedly, a household might be worried about self-control
problems among its members. If having 4 kg of rice makes household members more prone
to consume a little extra rice on any given day, the household could end up consuming its
rice store more quickly than planned.
A final set of possible factors relates to how people shop. Markets are gathering places
and centers of social life. There could be utility value from visiting the market frequently,
and making regular purchases may be a part of the implicit social contract. Or, it may be
the case that bulk discounts are a function of the relationships between buyers and sellers,
so that discounts are only available to those who make regular purchases from across the
quantity distribution. Additionally, it may be costly to coordinate purchases within the
household. For instance, if a person is at the market and considers buying some rice, she
may wonder whether someone else from the household has already purchased rice. To avoid
both a shortage and an excess of rice at home, it might be natural to purchase only 1 or 2
kg. Finally, it may be the case that when making purchases, shoppers are simply inattentive
to the magnitude of forgone consumption from purchasing in small quantities.
2.2 Framework for empirical analysis
In order to quantify the losses from not buying in bulk, we generalize the above approach to
reflect nuances in the data. We again begin with a set of focal quantities: suppose an item i is
available in the market in R focal quantities {qr}Rr=1, ordered so that q1 < q2 < ... < qR. Let
er denote the expenditure required to purchase quantity qr, and let pr denote the associated
unit price, so pr = er/qr. Suppose the focal quantities (weakly) exhibit bulk discounts, so
that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ... ≥ pR. A focal quantity should be interpreted as roughly a package size
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or a common unit of trade, analogous to the three quantities in our rice example. In some
cases these focal quantities correspond to actual package sizes from mass produced items,
such as 1 liter bottles of cooking oil. In other cases, local units have emerged over time as
vendors adopt widely available buckets or canisters as standard units of trade.
Our approach will be to identify focal quantities empirically, using commonly observed
transaction quantities. In the following section we will be precise about how we estimate
focal prices. For now, take it as given that we observe {qr}Rr=1 and {pr}Rr=1 for each item.
Over the two weeks during which it is observed, suppose that household h buys item
i in K separate transactions. Let k = 1, . . . , K index the household’s purchases, with the
associated quantities and expenditures denoted qhik and ehik, respectively. Household h’s
observed total expenditure on item i is ehi ≡
∑K
k=1 ehik, and its observed total quantity of
item i is qhi ≡
∑K
k=1 qhik. As in our motivating example, our goal is to calculate (i) the
financial savings if household h had instead purchased its entire observed total quantity in
a single transaction, and (ii) the extra quantity if household h had instead spent its entire
observed total expenditure in a single transaction. Before we can do so, however, we must
address some issues that arise in the data.
First, these calculations require knowing the expenditure associated with any quan-
tity, not just focal quantities. To reflect the reality of shopping in these markets, we base
such estimates on the expenditure required to purchase a particular quantity using only focal
quantities. Specifically, we define the expenditure schedule, e∗i (q), as follows. For any focal
quantity qr, we assign e
∗
i (qr) ≡ er. For any quantity that is between two focal quantities, we
use the weighted average of the expenditures for the closest focal quantities on either side:
for any q ∈ [qr, qr+1], e∗i (q) ≡
(
qr+1 − q
qr+1 − qr
)
er +
(
q − qr
qr+1 − qr
)
er+1.
Finally, we assign the lowest unit price (pR) to any quantity greater than the largest focal
quantity (i.e., e∗i (q) ≡ qpR for any q > qR), and the highest unit price (p1) to any quantity
less than the smallest focal quantity (i.e., e∗i (q) ≡ qp1 for any q < q1). Note that this
expenditure schedule can be converted into a unit price schedule using p∗i (q) = e
∗
i (q)/q.
There are two interpretations of this weighted average approach. The first relates to
actual behavior in the market. Consider a shopper in our motivating example trying to buy
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3 kg of rice in a single transaction. The buyer may argue that she should pay at most the 2
kg unit price, and perhaps an even lower unit price, given how much rice she is buying. If the
probability of receiving a particular unit price is proportional to the difference between the
quantity being purchased and the nearest focal quantities, our measure assigns the expected
value. A second interpretation relates to our choice of an aggregation period of two weeks,
which is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. In most cases, qhi, the aggregate quantity purchased
over two weeks, will not correspond to an exact focal quantity. But we could just as easily
aggregate purchases over a longer or shorter time period to ensure that qhi is equal to a focal
quantity. We are effectively calculating the expenditure associated with aggregating to the
next lower or next higher focal quantity, and then taking a weighted average.
A second issue is that while the majority of observed transactions take place at focal
quantities, some do not. Moreover, some transactions at focal quantities are not at focal
prices. To deal with idiosyncratic variation in quantities and unit prices, we project all
observed transactions onto the expenditure schedule prior to aggregation. Hence, observed
expenditure by household h on item i in transaction k can be represented as ehik = e
∗
i (qhik)+
νhik, where νhik is an idiosyncratic component. Then, household h’s adjusted expenditure on
item i in transaction k is eˆhik ≡ e∗i (qhik), and its adjusted total expenditure on item i is
eˆhi ≡
∑K
k=1 eˆhik. Using adjusted total expenditures in our calculations of losses will ensure
that our results are not distorted when a household’s actual expenditure in a particular
transaction happens to be above or below the expenditure schedule.
Although we will show that bulk discounts are clearly identifiable within-village and
even within-household, for power reasons we will construct e∗i (q) at the district level. This
is not as restrictive as it may sound. Households in a district might still face different
prices, due perhaps to variation in bargaining power, between-village price variation, or
residual variation in unobserved quality (in Section 3 we explain how we reduce the possibility
of unobserved quality variation). The identifying assumption for our analysis is that any
differences in expenditure schedules take the form of linear shifts over the relevant ranges.
That is, if e∗i (q) is the district-level price schedule for item i, but household h faces price
schedule e∗i (q) + γhiq for some scalar γhi, then our loss estimates are unbiased. The key is
that losses are based on relative differences in prices at different quantities, not on differences
in price levels.
10
p*(1)
p*(2)
p*(4)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
U
ni
t p
ric
e
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Quantity
e*(1)
e*(2)
e*(4)
A
B
C
D
A: observed expenditure
B: adjusted expenditure
C: counterfactual expenditure
D: counterfactual quantity
0
400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800
3200
3600
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Quantity
Unit price schedule Expenditure schedule
Figure 1: Expenditure and unit price for the example with 3 focal points
Notes: Authors’ calculations from example data in text.
With this framework, we can calculate the financial savings to household h if it had
purchased its entire observed total quantity over the two weeks in a single transaction.
Specifically, household h’s financial loss on item i is Lhi ≡ eˆhi− e∗i (qhi) =
(∑K
k=1 e
∗
i (qhik)
)
−
e∗i (qhi), and its percentage financial loss is L˜hi ≡ Lhi/eˆhi. By construction, Lhi and L˜hi are
zero if a household buys an item only once over two weeks. This is a conservative approach.
The items we study are popular consumer goods in Tanzania, and in many cases they can be
stored for months. Households that purchase item i only once over the study period could
in all likelihood reduce expenditure by bulk purchasing for a longer time period.
Alternatively, we can also calculate the extra quantity that household h could pur-
chase if it aggregated its spending on i into a single transaction. Specifically, inverting the
expenditure schedule, household h’s quantity loss on item i is Qhi ≡ e∗−1i (eˆhi)− qhi, and its
percentage quantity loss is Q˜hi ≡ Qhi/qhi. Again, Qhi and Q˜hi are zero for any item that a
household purchases only once. For much of the analysis, we will focus on the financial loss
measures, Lhi and L˜hi, because they can easily be aggregated across items (we will typically
refer to these as “loss” and “percentage loss”). However, the quantity loss measures provide
an additional way to understand the magnitude of the purchasing inefficiencies in the data.
Figure 1 gives an example our approach. Imagine a household that buys rice in
the market described in Section 2.1. The household reports three rice purchases over the
observation period: 1 kg for 1000 TZS, 1 kg for 1250 TZS, and 1.5 kg for 1500 TZS. The
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× in Figure 1 mark the actual transactions, with the unit price schedule in the left panel
and the expenditure schedule in the right panel. Observed expenditure is 3750 TZS (point
A). Adjusted expenditure is e∗(1) + e∗(1) + e∗(1.5) = 1000 + 1000 + 1300 = 3300 (point
B). Counterfactual expenditure from bulk purchasing is e∗(3.5) = 2200 (point C). These
three expenditure values are associated with the total observed quantity of 3.5 kg. Finally,
the counterfactual quantity that could be purchased using the total adjusted expenditure of
3300 all at once is e∗−1i (3300) = 3300/600 = 5.5 kg (point D). For this example, the financial
measures of loss are Lhi = 3300− 2200 = 1100 (the vertical distance between points B and
C), and L˜hi = 1100/3300 = 33.3%. The quantity measures of loss are Qhi = 5.5− 3.5 = 2 kg
(the horizontal distance between points B and D), and Q˜hi = 2/3.5 = 57.1%. This household
could reduce its expenditure on rice by 33.3% without reducing its quantity consumed, or it
could increase its quantity of rice consumed by 57.1% without increasing its expenditure.
This approach to constructing a counterfactual never requires that households have
access to additional cash in order to buy in bulk (though they might need the cash a little
sooner – see the extensive analysis in Section 5.1.1). In fact, buying in bulk frees up cash
for other purchases, or for buffer stock savings. Hence, there are no concerns about the risks
associated with a household “tying up” its liquid resources in the form of a bulk purchase.
Because we use observed total quantities in constructing the counterfactual – not large,
hypothetical purchases that are off of the observed support – buying in bulk as defined here
can only increase, not decrease, the household’s cash reserves over the total two week period.
A related point is that because we are estimating price schedules, not demand curves,
our approach is not threatened by censoring concerns related to using data from a 2-week
observation window. The most likely form of data censoring is that very large purchases,
e.g., of 90kg wholesale bags of grain, will be too infrequent to appear as focal quantities, even
though such unit/price combinations are widely available at weekly markets. The absence
of these discounted, large-quantity purchasing opportunities from our expenditure schedules
is yet another way that our estimated losses are likely to be lower bounds on actual losses.
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3 Data and descriptive patterns
The data for this paper are from the Survey of Household Welfare and Labour in Tanzania
(SHWALITA). The survey was part of an experiment to test the impact of questionnaire
design on consumption measures (see Beegle et al. (2012) for details). In one arm of the
study, 9 households per village were randomly assigned to complete a consumption diary in
one of three conditions. Three households completed a single, household-level diary, with
no monitoring by project staff. Three households also completed a single, household-level
diary, but received multiple follow-up visits from an enumerator or local assistant. Lastly,
in the final three households, each adult member kept his or her own diary, with children
placed on the diaries of the adults who knew most about their daily activities. Households in
the third group received multiple follow-up visits, similar to those in the second group. The
differences between module arms are small but non-negligible, and they have no impact on
the findings in this paper. We control for the diary module type in all relevant regressions.
The SHWALITA survey was conducted in 24 villages per district, in 7 districts. The
resulting data set includes responses for 1,512 diary households. We dropped 10 households
that did not purchase any of the items that we study, and 3 that did not complete the
end-line survey, leaving a sample size of 1,499. Data were collected from September 2007
to August 2008. All households in a given village completed their diaries over the same 14
days. Survey work in each district was completed in less than two months.4
Field team members also conducted a market price survey in each village, in con-
junction with the household survey. Focusing on 42 food items (10 of which met the criteria
for inclusion in this study), enumerators visited the village market and recorded the most
common units in which each item was sold, precisely measured the unit in kilograms or
liters, and noted the price. Unit prices were collected for up to three different units at the
item-vendor level, with the units determined by the vendor based on the most common units
of trade. This was done for three vendors per market, with 1-3 visits per vendor. The team
repeated the exercise at multiple markets if there was more than one in a village.
Each day during the study period, diary keepers recorded the quantity, unit, value,
and description of all items that entered or exited the household. Respondents separately
4More details are available at the project page, accessible here: http://edi-global.com/publications/.
Data are available by contacting the lead SHWALITA researchers listed on the project page.
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listed purchases, gifts, own production, and stock adjustments. We use only the purchasing
data, unless otherwise specified. After the diary period, project staff assigned each listed
item to one of 73 categories, covering 58 food items and 15 non-food items. For this paper
we drop items with too few observations, and drop perishable items that cannot be stored
for two weeks by most households (such as beef, milk, and fresh fish). We include one service
– milling of staple grains – which is frequently purchased. Importantly, we do not drop or
retain items based on whether the price schedule exhibits bulk discounts. This improves the
generalizability of our findings, and is useful for some of the tests implemented in Section 5.
To minimize quality variation within items, we use the detailed transaction descrip-
tions to standardize items. For example, we drop “unrefined sugar” from “Sugar”, retain
only “dried beans” from the original category of “Peas, beans, lentils and other pulses”, keep
only “immature coconuts” in the “Coconut” category, and restrict the “Dried fish” group
to only “dried sardines”, excluding larger fish. In this way we create 22 items that are far
more uniform than the goods in a typical consumption survey. Table 1 shows details.
A further cleaning step was required to standardize units. Respondents reported
many quantities in kilograms and liters, but others in bunches, heaps, tins, ladles, buckets or
bundles. We use the median, district-level conversion rates from the market price surveys to
convert local units into kilograms or liters. If a specific unit was not sufficiently covered by
the market price survey, the survey team purchased and weighed it for the unit in question.
Importantly, 98.7% of purchases recorded in units other than kilograms or liters were recorded
as integer values. Hence, non-integer entries in kilograms or liters are due to the fractional
conversion rates between units, not to respondent estimating fractional quantities, which
could introduce measurement error.
The final data set contains details for 56,892 separate transactions. From the purchase
quantity statistics in Table 1 we see that maize and cooking bananas, staple carbohydrates,
are the items purchased in the largest kilogram quantities. Comparing the average transac-
tion quantities to the average total 2-week purchase quantities, it is clear that the average
household buys the items it consumes multiple times over two weeks.
Table 2 shows the pattern of purchases and expenditures in the diary data, across
households, over the two weeks. The total number of observed transactions ranges from
688 (maize) to 5472 (tomatoes). The average item was purchased by just under half of the
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Table 1: Descriptions of item standardization and units
Description of item
Avg.
transaction
quantity
Avg. total
2 week
quantity Unit
Maize: loose, dried maize kernels. Excludes maize flour, maize cobs,
popcorn, or processed maize grains.
10.36 20.90 Kg
Milling: fee paid for machine-grinding. Mostly maize, but milling of
millet, sorghum and rice is not excluded.Husking rice is excluded.
8.60 20.57 Kg
Cooking Bananas: excludes any other type of banana such as roast-
ing bananas, beer bananas or sweet bananas.
7.63 17.32 Kg
Cassava: fresh, raw cassava. Excludes cassava flour and dried, boiled,
fried, or roasted cassava.
3.18 7.52 Kg
Soap: solid bar soap. Excludes powdered soap, beauty soap, dishwash-
ing liquid.
2.21 6.56 Kg
Charcoal: excludes wood, kerosene, other fuels for cooking. 2.06 13.05 Kg
Rice: husked white rice. Excludes unhusked, brown, broken rice. 1.63 5.86 Kg
Flour: white maize flour. Excludes brown flour, flours from wheat,
millet, sorghum.
1.27 7.19 Kg
Beans: dried kidney beans. Excludes fresh kidney beans, green beans,
other beans, green gram, lentils, chick peas, cow peas, pigeon peas,
bambarra nuts, garden peas.
0.85 2.19 Kg
Coconut: whole matured coconuts. Excludes immature coconuts. 0.76 3.88 Kg
Tomatoes: fresh, whole tomatoes. Excludes cherry tomatoes and
canned tomatoes.
0.57 2.85 Kg
Sugar: refined sugar. Excludes unrefined sugar, honey, syrup, other
sweeteners.
0.54 2.22 Kg
Salt: excludes coarse salt or any other spices. 0.52 1.06 Kg
Sweet Bananas: excludes cooking, roasting or beer bananas. 0.42 0.97 Kg
Dried sardines dried dagaa. Excludes fresh dagaa and other fish. 0.36 1.22 Kg
Onions: fresh, whole onions. 0.30 1.15 Kg
Tea Leaves: black tea leaves. Excludes other types of tea, ground
coffee, instant coffee and other raw ingredients for hot beverages.
0.02 0.08 Kg
Tea: black tea with milk, ready to drink. Exclude other types of tea,
coffee, cocoa, and any other hot beverage.
0.75 3.32 Liter
Kerosene: very homogenous so no need to exclude anything in this
category. Typically used for lighting and/or cooking.
0.26 0.95 Liter
Cooking Oil: liquid vegetable oil. Excludes, butter, ghee, other types
of fat.
0.19 0.84 Liter
Cigarettes: Portsman cigarettes. Excludes other brands, locally made
cigarettes, chewing tobacco, and raw tobacco.
5.10 30.69 Piece
Matches: excludes lighters or wicks. 1.97 4.18 Box
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data.
sample (725 households), and was purchased multiple times by just over a third of the sample.
Some items, such as sugar, tomatoes, dried sardines, onions, cooking oil, and kerosene, were
purchased more than once by a majority of households. Among only the households that
purchase each item, the highest average expenditure is on maize at 7,354 TZS/household,
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and the lowest is on matches at 194 TZS/household. The average number of purchases per
item is 3.6.
In Table 3 we report household summary statistics. Mean consumption per capita
is almost 400 USD per year, but the distribution is heavily skewed; the median is only 265
USD per year.5 The median household has 5 people. The “Wealth index value” is the value
of the first principal component from a vector of household assets (Filmer and Pritchett,
2001; Sahn and Stifel, 2003). The assets used to construct this wealth index include dwelling
characteristics such as roof material, wall material, and number of rooms, as well as ownership
of durable goods such as phones, other electronics, and bicycles.
We use this index as our primary measure of household wealth. Unlike consumption or
expenditure, it is not endogenous to consumer prices. One might worry that a stock measure
of assets does not adequately capture the dimension of heterogeneity that is most relevant
for purchasing behavior, i.e., heterogeneity in income or liquid wealth. We are not concerned
about this. The wealth index is strongly correlated with observed household expenditure
(r = 0.55), and the literature establishing the use of asset indexes in development economics
argues convincingly for their value as substitutes for income or expenditure data (Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001; Sahn and Stifel, 2003). However, for concerned readers, in Appendix section
A.1 we reconstruct any arguments that use the wealth index, substituting in annualized
household expenditure. None of the results change, though the endogeneity of expenditure
value to purchasing choices is clear in the level changes of some coefficients.
While writing this paper we conducted two additional, small-scale data collection
efforts. The first consisted of informal interviews and focus groups with people in Tanzania,
during the years 2012-2015. We interviewed roughly 10 individuals, mostly consumers but
also a few shopkeepers. We conducted three informal focus groups, two in the Kagera re-
gion and one in the Dodoma region, with 5-6 people at each. Through these interviews and
discussions we identified some of the hypotheses for why households might forego bulk dis-
counts, and heard stories about household shopping patterns that helped steer the analysis.
As qualitative work goes, our efforts were decidedly informal. Yet, these conversations were
highly informative. We make one mild empirical claim based on this work (in Section 5.2.3),
and we refer to some of the comments from interviewees when relevant.
5We convert Tanzania shillings to US dollars at a rate of 1,150 TZS/$1.
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Table 3: Summary statistics at the household level
Mean s.d. Median
Age of head (years) 46.66 16.03 44.00
Education of head (years) 4.73 3.75 7.00
Head is female (=1) 0.20 0.40 0.00
Household size 5.33 2.96 5.00
Share under 15 yrs old 0.42 0.24 0.50
Share over 65 yrs old 0.07 0.19 0.00
Urban area (=1) 0.34 0.48 0.00
Acres owned 3.83 5.56 2.00
Wealth index value -0.01 1.00 -0.43
Nominal consumption (TZS/yr) 2001642 1974544 1449216
Nominal consumption (USD/yr) 1741 1717 1260
Nominal consumption per capita (TZS/yr) 450154 469498 304887
Nominal consumption per capita (USD/yr) 391 408 265
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Sample size is 1,497, because two households
with incomplete demographic data are not included. 1,150 TZS = 1 USD.
Our second data collection effort was an on-line survey conducted in June-July 2016.
This short survey was sent to a group of Tanzanians with extensive experience studying
household decision-making around economic issues. We asked these respondents to charac-
terize items by the likelihood that they are “temptation goods”, i.e., items that one tends
to over-consume (relative to a plan) when held in stock. We describe this survey in more
detail in Section 5.2.2.
4 Quantifying the value of forgone consumption
In this section we estimate the value of consumption that households forego by not buying in
bulk. In Section 4.1 we describe the bulk discounts and the estimated expenditure schedules.
In Section 4.2 we examine the robustness of the estimated schedules. Finally, in Section 4.3
we estimate financial losses and quantity losses. We also examine the distributions and
correlates of financial losses from not buying in bulk.
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Table 4: Regressions of unit price on quantity, various specifications
Dependent variable: transaction-level unit price
Market surveys Transaction diary data
Item (1) (2) (3) N (4) (5) N
Rice -51.8*** -36.8* -39.8** 739 -4.7* -9.5** 3303
(6.7) (15.5) (14.0) (2.0) (2.6)
Maize -0.8*** -0.9 -1.0 680 -3.7* -6.1** 688
(0.0) (0.6) (0.8) (1.6) (2.4)
Flour -231.5 -379.8** -380.4** 532 -9.6** -7.8** 4042
(138.5) (108.6) (154.2) (3.2) (3.1)
Cassava -24.2* -223.2*** -228.2*** 452 -3.9 -2.3 881
(10.2) (21.5) (39.3) (9.0) (1.9)
Cooking Bananas 1.9 6.7 6.6 522 -40.7* -23.4** 726
(4.9) (4.5) (5.8) (16.9) (6.3)
Sugar -1036.5 -1276.9 -1208.1 877 -94.5* -78.1** 4293
(1034.3) (1383.9) (1695.4) (40.0) (29.6)
Beans -3.7 -6.8* -5.0 740 -17.9 -32.9* 2051
(3.8) (2.8) (3.2) (24.0) (15.8)
Sweet Bananas -32.4*** -35.1*** -35.7** 459 -369.6 -210.4* 749
(7.9) (9.3) (14.4) (403.5) (89.3)
Dried sardines 59.6 144.3 191.8 724 -371.5** -336.4** 3523
(414.8) (280.1) (400.4) (129.4) (127.4)
Cooking Oil -643.4** -638.7** -615.9* 1312 -1135.8*** -1199.8*** 5297
(234.2) (250.7) (278.3) (253.3) (239.5)
Milling -0.9* -0.9** 1356
(0.3) (0.3)
Coconut -21.6 -47.5** 1905
(15.3) (9.4)
Tomatoes -83.1 -129.5* 5472
(46.5) (63.0)
Onions -419.0** -396.4*** 4127
(119.9) (79.0)
Salt -358.9 -267.2 2299
(320.6) (215.6)
Tea -9.6 -8.6 1565
(15.9) (18.5)
Tea Leaves -27319.1** -27338.0** 2227
(7765.7) (8420.1)
Charcoal -17.0** -19.8 1713
(3.9) (9.7)
Kerosene -1378.3** -1206.5*** 4558
(425.0) (297.6)
Matches -2.5 -2.7 1958
(2.6) (2.3)
Soap -2.4* -4.7** 3202
(1.2) (1.6)
Cigarettes -0.1 -0.1** 957
(0.1) (0.0)
Fixed effects District Village Vendor Vill-day Household
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered at district level;
*** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. Controls for diary type included in regressions underlying columns 3 and 4. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression of unit price on quantity, for only the item indicated.
4.1 Bulk discounts in the data
While our main analysis uses focal points in the diary data to estimate price schedules (as
described in Section 2.2), we first show that bulk discounts are present in the market price
survey data. Survey team members collected these data at local markets, concurrently with
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the transaction diary surveys. Columns 1–3 of Table 4 show slope coefficients from item-
specific, transaction-level regressions, with unit price as the dependent variable and quantity
as the independent variable, using the market price survey data.6 The underlying regressions
include district (column 1), village (column 2), or vendor (column 3) fixed effects, with
standard errors clustered at the district level. Sample sizes for reach regression are shown in
the column to the right of column 2. The majority of coefficients in columns 1–3 are negative
and statistically significant. There are no positive and significant slope coefficients. The clear
pattern is that unit price is decreasing in quantity for many items, even within-vendor.
For comparison purposes we estimate similar regressions using the diary data. Columns
4 and 5 of Table 4 show the slope coefficients. As in columns 1–3, every estimated slope
coefficient is negative. This holds both within village-day (column 4), where 13 of 22 slope
coefficients are negative and significant, and within household (column 5), where 17 of 22
coefficients are negative and significant. The within-item level differences between the coef-
ficients in columns 1–3 and columns 4–5 are due both to variation in the quantity support
across data sets, and to the fact that the diary data are implicitly weighted by the frequency
with which certain quantities appear in the diaries.7
Having established that bulk discounts exist, we now pursue the non-parametric ap-
proach of Section 2.2, which uses focal points that are less susceptible to measurement error
than parametric approximations of price schedules, and that reflect the reality of shopping
in these markets. We designate a quantity as focal if it accounts for at least 5% of all
observations at the item-district level.8 By this definition there are 1-9 focal quantities
per item-district, with just over 3.3 on average. Overall, 70.2% of purchases are at focal
quantities. We use the median unit price at the focal quantity to estimate the focal price.
6Note that in these regressions there would be no benefit to pooling and using a full set of interactions.
The units and scale vary across items, so we allow the levels of the fixed effects to vary as well.
7One might be concerned about division bias from constructing unit price as the quotient of two variables
measured with error. To examine this, we estimated expenditure schedules by regressing transaction-level
expenditure on quantity and its square, suppressing the constant and fixed effects to enforce regression
through the origin. The coefficient on q2 is negative and significant for 10 of 22 items, negative and close
to significant for 5 others, and never positive and significant. The implication is that expenditure schedules
are generally concave, which is consistent with bulk discounts. Results in online appendix Table A.1.
8We ignore the roughly 1 in 5 candidate focal quantities that either require greater total expenditure
than a larger-quantity focal point, or that have a higher unit price than a smaller-quantity focal point.
These points can never be part of an optimal counterfactual purchase. Because this also impacts adjusted
expenditure, dropping these points has the effect of attenuating losses (average losses are nearly 70% higher
if we do not drop these points). This is another way that our approach is conservative in estimating losses.
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Table 5: Example focal quantities and prices from a single district
Focal point cumulative
Item Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 % coverage
Rice Quantity .5 1 1.5 2 3
Frequency (%) 12.3 42.6 10.5 16.4 6 87.8
Median unit price 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Expenditure 500 1000 1500 2000 3000
Sugar Quantity .05 .25 .5 1 .
Frequency (%) 6.2 50.1 17.6 17.2 . 91.1
Median unit price 2000 1000 1000 1000 .
Expenditure 100 250 500 1000 .
Tomatoes Quantity .35 1.05 . . .
Frequency (%) 41.8 6.1 . . . 47.9
Median unit price 571 286 . . .
Expenditure 200 300 . . .
Onions Quantity .05 .1 .35 .7 .
Frequency (%) 30.6 9.1 36.8 11.3 . 87.8
Median unit price 1000 1000 286 286 .
Expenditure 50 100 100 200 .
Dried sardines Quantity .1083 .2167 .325 . .
Frequency (%) 12.8 17.6 6.6 . . 37.0
Median unit price 1385 923 923 . .
Expenditure 150 200 300 . .
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Focal points are quantities that account for at least
5% of transactions at the district level.
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for a set of example price schedules from one of
the study districts. Quantities are in kilogram units. Rows show the quantity, percentage of
purchases, median unit price, and expenditure at each focal point. Bulk discounts are visible
in the unit prices: the minimum unit price becomes available at 0.25 kg of sugar, 1.05 kg of
tomatoes, 0.35 kg of onions, and 0.22 kg of dried sardines. In this district, rice prices are
linear, so losses on rice are zero by construction. For some of the tests in Section 5 it will
be useful to define q∗min, the minimum quantity that must be purchased to reach the lowest
available unit price, and e∗min, the minimum expenditure to access the lowest available unit
price (i.e., to purchase q∗min). In Table 5, q
∗
min (e
∗
min) is equal to 0.5 kg (500 TZS) for rice,
0.25 kg (250 TZS) for sugar, 1.05 kg (300 TZS) for tomatoes, and 0.35 kg (100 TZS) for
onions. The final column shows the percentage of transactions in the item-district group
that are covered by the focal quantities. Coverage rates range from 37–91%; all but two are
69% or greater. Across all item–districts, three quarters of the coverage rates are above 50%.
To provide a visual example of an estimated set of schedules, Figure 2 depicts ex-
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Table 6: Summary statistics across districts for q∗min and e
∗
min, by item
Across the 7 study districts...
Average q∗min e
∗
min
quantity
purchased Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Item (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Maize 20.9 9.38 3 20 2414 750 6498
Kerosene .95 .86 .5 1 1071 600 1300
Cooking Bananas 17.32 10.8 1.72 28 1067 201 1708
Cooking Oil .84 .51 .05 1 850 100 1800
Rice 5.86 1.14 .5 4 771 300 2400
Sugar 2.22 .5 .25 2 629 250 2600
Flour 7.19 1.39 .25 4 617 100 1600
Charcoal 13.05 2.61 1.45 7.25 400 200 700
Beans 2.19 .43 .25 1 400 200 900
Coconut 3.88 .88 .57 1.1 383 200 550
Milling 20.57 9.17 4 20 349 100 700
Cassava 7.52 2.68 .58 8.67 325 50 997
Sweet Bananas .97 1.57 .05 8.61 276 50 550
Salt 1.06 .57 .25 1 264 100 500
Tea Leaves .08 .08 .01 .25 243 50 500
Soap 6.56 2.29 1 8 243 100 704
Dried sardines 1.22 .27 .14 .5 186 100 300
Tomatoes 2.85 .65 .35 1.4 171 100 300
Matches 4.18 3.57 1 10 133 30 400
Onions 1.15 .51 .05 1.4 114 50 200
Tea 3.32 .5 .5 .5 100 100 100
Cigarettes 30.69 2 1 6 91 50 240
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Column 1 refers to average total purchase over 2 weeks
at the household-item level, for households that purchased positive amounts of the item. Table is sorted by
column 5. Units listed in Table 1.
penditures and unit prices by quantity for the 686 purchases of kerosene in one of the study
districts. The size of the circles corresponds to the number of transactions at the circle
center. The triangles represent the estimated focal points, and the solid lines mark the unit
price (left panel) and expenditure (right panel) schedules. In the left side panel, the down-
ward orientation of the unit prices is clear. In the right side panel, the changing slope of the
expenditure line represents the drop in unit prices as quantity increases. The clustering of
purchases at a small number of quantities is also clear.
We have shown a general pattern of bulk discounts in the data. However, it is
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Figure 2: Expenditure and unit price for kerosene purchases in one district
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. We dropped 11 outliers to im-
prove readability of these figures.
important to note that in each district there are also some items that do not exhibit bulk
discounts. Estimated unit price schedules are flat for 64 of the 146 item-district groups
in the data. Some items exhibit bulk discounts in every district. These include maize,
cooking oil, kerosene, cooking bananas, and tea leaves. Unit price schedules for other items,
including sweet bananas, cooking bananas, onions, salt, milling, and dried sardines, are
downward-sloping in a majority of districts. In contrast, brewed tea never exhibits bulk
discounts, while cigarettes, beans, rice, cassava, and matches only exhibit discounts in 1 or
2 districts. In Section 5.2.1 we will use within-household variation in whether items exhibit
bulk discounts to study the salience of those discounts at the time of purchase.9
What does it mean to “buy in bulk” in this setting? When we think of bulk purchasing
consumer items in developing countries, we typically envision buying 1 or more months’
worth of an item all at once. In these data the situation is much less extreme. To see this,
we compare average total 2-week purchase quantities to q∗min. Because price schedules are
estimated at the district level, there are up to seven possible values of q∗min and e
∗
min for each
item. Table 6 shows the mean, minimum, and maximum values of these two statistics, across
the seven districts. The table also includes the mean quantity purchased over 2 weeks, in
column 1, for sake of comparison with q∗min. In columns 3, 4, 6, and 7 we see substantial
9Why discounts emerge for only some items, and why they persist despite apparently robust competition
in retail markets, are open questions not addressed in this paper. See Attanasio and Pastorino (2015).
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spatial variation in the minimum and maximum of q∗min and e
∗
min; what it means to “buy in
bulk” varies across districts. Nonetheless, among households that purchase each item, the
mean quantity purchased substantially exceeds the average value of q∗min.
Median = 8.33
Mean = 11.37
75th percentile = 13.96
90th percentile = 21.64
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
.1
0 10 20 30 40
Figure 3: Average days of consumption represented by q∗min
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. We
dropped 2 outliers to improve readability, but those outliers are
still represented in the cited statistics.
To show this even more clearly, we divide q∗min by the average quantity purchased,
at the district level, and multiply by 14. These values answer the question: “How many
days’ worth of consumption are represented by q∗min?” Figure 3 shows the histogram of
results, only including item-district pairs that exhibit bulk discounts (if we include the other
items the distribution shifts significantly left). The median is 8.33 days. That is, in half
of cases, “bulk purchasing” involves buying roughly a week’s or less worth of consumption.
The 75th and 90th percentiles are at roughly 2 and 3 weeks’ worth of consumption. Hence,
even though we use 2-week transaction diaries, for most items the relevant time frame for
storing and consuming a bulk purchase is substantially shorter. The averages for tomatoes,
onions, and cooking bananas – the items that might be perishable over two weeks and that
also contribute to bulking losses in a meaningful way for the households that purchase them
(see next subsection) – are 5.2 days, 6.5 days, and 12.9 days. The higher value for cooking
bananas is driven by one outlier district where cooking bananas are not commonly consumed.
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4.2 Robustness of price schedules
The estimated schedules represent the counterfactual cost of purchasing at quantities greater
than or equal to the observed quantities. In this subsection we examine the validity of the
schedules as a set of counterfactuals. We first consider whether bulk discounts are a function
of buyer-seller relationships, and available only to locals. We then examine variation around
the expenditure schedules – variation in unit price, conditional on quantity – to determine
whether this is a dimension along which poor and rich households face different prices.
4.2.1 Are bulk discounts dependent on buyer-seller relationships?
Could it be that bulk discounts are only available to consumers who have a relationship with
a vendor? In this case, a buyer might pay higher unit prices today as an investment in a
relationship that will allow future access to better prices. Our data could reflect a point-in-
time snapshot of an ongoing process in which consumers gradually cultivate, maintain, and
sometimes lose these vendor relationships. Or, it may be that vendors are only willing to
sell some items as “loss leaders” – large quantity purchases provided at a heavy discount –
when they are combined with smaller quantity purchases at higher unit prices.
The data collected by project staff members from local markets allow us to reject this
hypothesis. In the market price surveys, bulk discounts are clearly present (see columns 1
and 2 of Table 4). Yet, these staff members had no prior relationship with vendors, and asked
only about purchasing one item at a time. Clearly, consumers do not need to invest in long-
term relationships with sellers, nor must they combine large and small quantity purchases,
in order to receive bulk discounts.
4.2.2 Heterogeneity around the expenditure schedules
Although our focus is on bulk discounts and why households might not take advantage of
them, it is worth taking a moment to explore the nature of residual variation around the
expenditure schedule. As suggested in the motivating example in Section 2.2, we observe
many instances in which the price for the same quantity of the same item varies between
transactions. Because of how we construct Lh and L˜h, this price variation does not impact
our loss analysis directly. But it does represent a second dimension of between-household
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variation in prices that may be responsible for the “poor pay more” hypothesis.
In Table 7 we show the proportion of transactions for each item that are below, on,
and above the expenditure schedule. There is less variation than one might expect. On
average, 46% of transactions are exactly on the schedule, with 19% below and 35% above.
At the top of the table, with 74–95% of prices falling on the schedule, we find matches, tea
and cigarettes. These are highly standardized goods that are sold in clearly identifiable and
uniform units. At the bottom of the list are cooking bananas and cassava, with less than 20%
of transactions on the schedule. These goods are typically sold in imprecise units (heaps,
bunches). This suggests that some of the variation in unit price conditional on quantity may
be due to measurement error, either at the time of purchase or during data collection.
Table 7: Position of transaction expenditure relative to expenditure schedule
Below On Above
Item (1) (2) (3)
Cigarettes 0.01 0.95 0.04
Tea 0.10 0.78 0.12
Matches 0.14 0.74 0.12
Sugar 0.17 0.70 0.13
Onions 0.17 0.61 0.21
Soap 0.11 0.57 0.32
Tomatoes 0.18 0.52 0.30
Rice 0.20 0.49 0.31
Tea Leaves 0.11 0.48 0.41
Beans 0.28 0.44 0.28
Salt 0.18 0.42 0.40
Kerosene 0.26 0.39 0.36
Charcoal 0.26 0.38 0.36
Dagaa 0.13 0.35 0.52
Cooking Oil 0.20 0.35 0.46
Coconut 0.33 0.32 0.34
Sweet Bananas 0.17 0.30 0.53
Maize 0.27 0.25 0.48
Flour 0.21 0.22 0.57
Milling 0.20 0.20 0.61
Cooking Bananas 0.32 0.17 0.50
Cassava 0.47 0.12 0.41
AVERAGE 0.19 0.46 0.35
Wealth index quartile 1 0.17 0.48 0.35
Wealth index quartile 2 0.18 0.46 0.35
Wealth index quartile 3 0.20 0.47 0.33
Wealth index quartile 4 0.20 0.45 0.35
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. The wealth index is defined with quartile 1 as
the poorest. Table sorted by decreasing values of column 2.
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In Section 2.2 we labeled the idiosyncratic component of price, conditional on quan-
tity, as νhik. This residual variation could reflect unobserved item quality, bargaining skill,
shopping effort, or other factors. We can calculate the empirical analog of this term as the
difference between observed and adjusted expenditure, i.e., νˆhik = ehik − eˆhik. By definition,
the 46% of transactions that take place on the expenditure schedule have νˆhik = 0. To
examine the correlates of νˆhik, we first normalize it to its percentage difference from the
expenditure schedule: νˆnhik = νˆhik/eˆhik =
ehik−eˆhik
eˆhik
, where the “n” superscript indicates “nor-
malized.” The mean of νˆnhik is 0.16, indicating that the average transaction is 0.16 standard
deviations above the expenditure schedule.10
Table 8: Regressions with idiosyncratic price component as dep. variable, transaction level
Dependent variable: νˆnhik |νˆnhik|
(1) (2)
Quantity z-score -0.029 -0.022
(0.02) (0.02)
Precise unit (=1) 0.112 0.116
(0.10) (0.10)
Market day purchase (=1) 0.013*** 0.007
(0.00) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) -0.017 -0.011
(0.02) (0.02)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) -0.002 0.001
(0.02) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 0.032 0.021
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 53588 53588
R-squared 0.20 0.23
Mean of dep. variable 0.16 0.24
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects, item fixed effects, and controls for questionnaire module. Sample includes 1,496 households in 168
villages in 7 districts. We dropped observations in the 1% upper and lower tails of the νˆnhik distribution.
To examine the variation in νˆnhik, we estimate regressions of the level and absolute
value of νˆnhik on transaction and household characteristics. We use both the level and absolute
value as dependent variables so as to explore factors associated with higher prices and greater
spread. Table 8 shows results. The variables of main interest are the wealth quartile dummies
and the variable “Precise unit”, which takes a value of 1 if the unit involved in the transaction
10Recall that the focal expenditures that underlie the expenditure schedule are medians. The average
transaction lies above the schedule because there is positive skewness in expenditure conditional on quantity.
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is standardized and precisely defined (at the local level), and zero otherwise.11 Regressions
also include district effects, item effects, questionnaire effects, controls for quantity (via
item-level z-scores), and controls for purchases on village market days.
Results are broadly similar across the two columns of Table 8. There is only one
statistically significant coefficient, in column 1, indicating that average prices are slightly
higher on market days. The “Precise unit” variable is not statistically different from zero, and
has the opposite sign of that expected.12 Otherwise, the main takeaway is that the residual
component of prices does not vary meaningfully with wealth. The estimated coefficients on
the wealth quartile dummy variables are neither economically nor statistically significant.
This establishes the main result for this subsection: on average, there do not appear to be
unobserved transaction characteristics that lead to poor households paying different prices
from wealthy households for the same quantity of the same item.
4.3 The value of forgone consumption
We turn now to our key welfare measures: the quantity and value of forgone consumption
from buying in small quantities. Recall from section 2.2 that the quantity of consumption
forgone is given by Qhi = q
∗
hi − qhi, where the first term is the inverse of the expenditure
function evaluated at total adjusted expenditure e∗hi, and the second term is total observed
quantity. Likewise, the financial loss, or value of forgone consumption, is defined as Lhi =
eˆhi − e∗hi, where eˆhi is total adjusted expenditure and e∗hi is the cost of buying qhi in a single
transaction. Summing across items at the household level gives Lh =
∑
i Lhi.
We begin with the quantity measures. In columns 1–3 of Table 9 we report the
item-level means of total observed quantity, qhi, counterfactual quantity, q
∗
hi, and the coun-
terfactual increase in quantity in percentage terms, Q˜hi. Calculations in this table are based
on all households that purchase an item more than once. The results are striking: without
11Based on the market survey efforts of the research team, we designated the following units as precise:
kilogram, liter, 25kg bag, 50kg bag, debe, kisadolini, and packet of tea leaves. These units are associated
with standardized quantities that were measured by the research team at markets in every village. Imprecise
units include bowls, cups, pieces, heaps, and others. These were also surveyed and measured by the research
team, but they are prone to greater measurement error. Approximately 63% of transactions were recorded
in precise units.
12If we exclude item fixed effects from these regressions, the “Precise unit” coefficient is negative, larger
in magnitude, and borderline statistically significant. The implication is that if measurement error matters,
the effect is not distinguishable from between-item variation in price conditional on quantity.
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changing total expenditure, households could increase quantity purchased by almost 16% on
average. Potential quantity increases are over 25% for kerosene, onions, cooking bananas,
cooking oil, tea leaves, and dried sardines. These are staple goods: kerosene is the primary
lighting fuel in much of Tanzania, cooking bananas are a staple carbohydrate (in the two
districts where they are most commonly purchased), dried sardines are a key source of pro-
tein, and cooking oil is the main source of cooking fat. Most households purchase one or
more of these goods: 85% purchase kerosene, 78% purchase cooking oil, 70% purchase dried
sardines, and 21% purchase cooking bananas (Table 2). By choosing to spend eˆhi in small
increments, the average household is sharply reducing its consumption of these staple items.
The welfare losses implied by columns 1–3 of Table 9, then, are substantial at face value.
The money-metric measures of loss tell a similar story. In columns 5–7 of Table 9 we
report summary statistics for eˆhi, Lhi, and L˜hi. (The table is sorted by decreasing values of
column 7, so that high loss items are at the top. From now on we will usually display items
in that order.) On average, losses represent 8.9% of total expenditure at the household-
item level. For a number of frequently purchased items – dried sardines, onions, kerosene,
cooking oil, cooking bananas, tomatoes – losses represent more than 10% of expenditure. In
columns 5–7 of the lower panel of Table 9 we report summary statistics for all households
represented in the upper part of the table, divided into those above/below median Lh. We
calculate household-level means by first summing adjusted expenditure (eˆh =
∑
i eˆhi) at the
household level, then averaging. We define the household-level percentage loss measure, L˜h,
as L˜h = Lh/eˆh. Not surprisingly, losses vary substantially across households. The overall
household-level average is 840 TZS, or 6.9% of expenditure. Financial losses among the
above median group represent almost 10% of total expenditure, on average.
Figure 4 shows histograms and kernel density estimates for the distributions of Lh
(left panel) and L˜h (right panel) among multi-purchase household-item pairs. Items with flat
price schedules are not dropped, so as not to bias the estimates toward large losses. There
is substantial between-household variation in losses. Approximately 8% of households incur
zero losses (with our conservative approach to estimation). Yet, nearly a quarter (24%) incur
losses above 10% of expenditure.
What drives the substantial between-household variation in financial losses? To ex-
amine whether particular types of households are more prone to forego bulk discounts, we
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Table 9: Purchase quantities and expenditures: Observed and counterfactual
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ITEM-LEVEL MEANS
Quantity
Potential
quantity
%
change
Num. HHs
multiple
Adjusted
expenditure Loss % Loss
Item qhi q
∗
hi Q˜hi purchasing eˆhi Lhi L˜hi
Kerosene 1.12 1.33 33.3 946 1730 289 19.8
Onions 1.42 1.81 46.1 791 522 95 19.7
Cooking Bananas 26.65 31.06 50.7 170 3044 496 18.4
Cooking Oil 0.99 1.19 26.4 915 2149 311 16.5
Tea Leaves 0.09 0.11 31.5 387 482 57 16.1
Dried sardines 1.53 1.71 28.6 781 903 113 13.8
Tomatoes 3.39 3.89 17.5 881 1244 107 11.1
Salt 1.41 1.48 7.5 666 671 37 6.9
Coconut 4.53 4.80 7.7 305 1889 115 6.8
Maize 34.12 36.12 8.3 141 11846 711 6.6
Sweet Bananas 1.47 1.55 6.3 143 1157 31 4.7
Cassava 11.73 12.14 5.6 190 1355 66 4.6
Soap 8.58 8.88 4.5 728 925 36 4.4
Charcoal 14.88 15.37 7.2 224 5465 56 4.2
Milling 29.89 30.56 3.0 305 856 22 2.8
Matches 5.44 5.56 2.5 513 248 5 2.2
Cigarettes 40.40 40.55 0.4 111 1955 14 1.2
Sugar 2.70 2.71 0.8 781 3212 19 1.1
Flour 8.76 8.82 0.7 545 4944 38 1.0
Rice 7.55 7.59 0.6 614 6385 43 0.9
Beans 2.81 2.81 0.5 495 2809 9 0.5
Tea 4.53 4.53 0.0 236 905 0 0.0
AVERAGE 15.6 2106 112 8.9
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL MEANS
Households eˆh Lh L˜h
All 15826 840 6.9
Below median 9290 198 4.5
Above median 22335 1480 9.3
Notes: Calculations based on multi-purchasing households; Lhi and percent change both set to zero for single-purchasing
households; for Item panel, columns 3 and 6 calculated at household-item level before averaging across items, and column 3
calculated after throwing out upper 1% tail; for Household panel, “median” refers to median of Lh.
estimate household-level descriptive regressions of Lh and L˜h on a vector of household char-
acteristics. These regressions do not include item- or transaction-level characteristics, such
as the precision of units used to measure transaction quantity, or the temptingness of a good.
We consider these, and other sources of heterogeneity, in Section 5.
Results are shown in Table 10. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates with Lh as the
dependent variable. In both columns we see that the poorest quartile of households (the
excluded category) have lower losses than the other three quarters of households, though
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Figure 4: Distribution of financial losses
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. The average exchange rate during the study
period was 1,150 TZS per US dollar.
the differences are only weakly statistically significant. The age, gender, and education level
of the household head do not meaningfully co-move with losses. Larger households exhibit
slightly greater losses, a result we discuss further in Section 5.2.4.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 report the results of the same specifications, with L˜h
as the dependent variable. Households in the first two wealth quartiles have similar mean
percentage losses, but percentage losses are slightly lower for those in the third quartile, and
substantially lower for those in the wealthiest quartile. The estimated coefficients on head
of household characteristics, in column 4, are too small in magnitude to be of importance.
While distance from the community center is statistically significantly associated with lower
normalized losses, the effect is not especially meaningful given the distribution of distances
in the data (mean 0.6 kilometers, s.d. 0.7).
Perhaps the most interesting results in Table 10 are those related to wealth. When
using levels (columns 1-2), losses appear to be positively related to wealth. When using
percentages, losses are negatively related to wealth. This pattern indicates that there may
be different types of loss-prone households – wealthy households that suffer large losses in
levels but small losses as a percentage of total spending, and poor households that suffer
small losses in levels but large losses as a percentage of total spending. To investigate this
possibility, Table 11 presents summary statistics for four groups of households (moving from
column 2 to column 5): (i) households in the highest quartile of Lh but not the highest
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Table 10: Loss regressed on household characteristics
Dependent variable: Loss Loss % Loss % Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 162.752* 153.190* -0.002 -0.001
(78.307) (72.942) (0.006) (0.006)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 153.415 140.203 -0.010** -0.010**
(107.081) (126.721) (0.004) (0.003)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 270.419* 228.306 -0.033** -0.034***
(116.184) (158.872) (0.010) (0.009)
Age of head (years) -5.320* -0.001**
(2.352) (0.000)
Head is female (=1) 29.313 0.003
(78.002) (0.005)
Head years of education -0.908 -0.001
(15.013) (0.001)
Household size 78.799* -0.004
(32.241) (0.003)
Distance to community center (km) -91.024 -0.006**
(70.775) (0.002)
Observations 1471 1465 1471 1465
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.21
Mean dep. var. 840 837 0.069 0.069
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects, controls for demographic composition of the household, and controls for questionnaire module. The
wealth index is defined with quartile 1, the excluded group, as the poorest.
quartile of L˜h, (ii) households in the highest quartile of L˜h but not the highest quartile of
Lh, (iii) households in the highest quartile for both losses and percentage losses, and (iv)
households that are in neither worst quartile.
Groups (i) and (ii) look like the rich and poor households discussed in the previous
paragraph. The 12% of households that have high losses but not high percentage losses
(column 2) appear to be upper-class households. They make substantially more purchases,
spend more than twice as much, and buy many more items than the average household.
Their average level of the wealth index is almost a full standard deviation above the mean,
and they are larger, more educated, and live nearer to the city center. In contrast, the 12%
of households that have high percentage losses but not high level losses (column 3) appear
to be poor and disadvantaged households. These households are smaller, less educated, and
poorer in both expenditure and wealth terms.
Group (iii), the 13% of households that are in both high-loss categories (column 4),
are interesting for a different reason: they exhibit very large losses despite having close to
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Table 11: Summary statistics by loss categories, household level
Among the 25% highest loss households by...
Overall Lh only L˜h only
Both Lh
and L˜h Neither
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Proportion in group 1.00 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.63
Number of transactions 37.95 79.53 23.95 49.32 30.49
Number of items purchased 10.65 14.36 8.93 12.15 9.96
Adjusted expenditure 17589 40975 6186 19299 14985
Adjusted expenditure per capita 4060 8447 2055 4311 3565
Loss (level) 825.54 1944.99 658.04 2283.98 343.85
Loss (%) 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.03
Wealth index -0.01 0.83 -0.41 -0.01 -0.10
Distance to comm. center (km) 0.61 0.36 0.57 0.53 0.67
Head age (years) 46.66 46.44 46.25 41.13 47.98
Head education (years) 4.73 5.77 3.78 5.17 4.60
Head is female (=1) 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.20
Household size 5.33 6.14 4.32 5.25 5.39
Number of children 9-14 0.91 1.14 0.65 0.87 0.92
Number of adults 15-59 2.50 3.06 1.99 2.43 2.50
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Sample includes 1,497 households with complete data.
average expenditures. They also have near average wealth, household size, and education.
Their most notable characteristic is that the household heads are younger and more likely to
be male, raising the interesting possibility that they lack the foresight or maturity to organize
household finances. Otherwise, there is little besides their inefficient shopping patterns that
distinguishes these households from the average.
When we investigate in Section 5 why some households forego bulk discounts, we will
often use the categorization of households from Table 11. Indeed, given how different these
three groups of loss-prone households appear to be, it seems plausible that they suffer losses
for different reasons.
5 What explains the observed purchasing patterns?
We now turn to the mechanisms that lead households to engage in financially inefficient
purchasing by foregoing bulk discounts. We consider a number of possibilities, as previewed
in Section 2. We collect these mechanisms into two groups: those that we argue we can reject
(Section 5.1), and those that we think might be playing a significant role (Section 5.2).
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5.1 Mechanisms that we reject
Our analysis leads us to reject the following mechanisms as reasons for the observed pur-
chasing patterns: binding liquidity constraints, utility from frequent shopping, storage and
transport costs, and ignorance of bulk discounts. By “reject” we do not mean that these
mechanisms are irrelevant for all households. Rather, we do not think these mechanisms are
responsible to any substantial degree for the losses that we identify in Section 4.
5.1.1 Liquidity constraints
Perhaps the most natural explanation for the losses in our data is that people would like
to take advantage of bulk discounts, but they lack the liquidity to do so. Prior work has
emphasized that poor households may pay higher unit prices than wealthy households be-
cause binding liquidity constraints prevent them from taking advantage of bulk discounts.
Initial evidence against this hypothesis is in Table 10, where we see that wealthier households
do indeed incur losses (column 1). To look for other differences between wealthy and poor
households that might be indicative of liquidity constraints, we investigate whether poorer
households generally buy in smaller quantities than wealthier households. Table 12 shows
the average purchase quantities for each item, by wealth quartile (wealth quartiles are de-
fined within districts, to match the expenditure schedules). Items are ordered by decreasing
values of average percentage losses (from column 7, Table 9). Looking across rows of the
table, it is clear that the average quantities in the first wealth quartile are not generally
smaller than those in the fourth quartile. For two of the first four goods listed, the poorest
quarter of households buy the largest quantities, on average. Across the remaining goods
there is no clear ranking between the wealth quartiles. In combination with the finding in
Table 8 that the poor do not pay higher prices than the wealthy for the same quantities,
there is no evidence of the poor paying higher prices because they cannot take advantage of
bulk discounts.
Of course, these rich-vs.-poor analyses assume that poorer households are more likely
to be liquidity constrained. Yet it is possible that many households in the data, including
many wealthy households, are liquidity constrained. Hence, the main evidence against the
liquidity constraint hypothesis comes from asking the following: for how many days would
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Table 12: Average quantity per transaction, by item
Wealth Quartile (1 = poorest)
Item 1 2 3 4
Kerosene 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.35
Onions 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.31
Cooking Bananas 10.95 7.59 6.99 5.82
Cooking Oil 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.24
Tea Leaves 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Dried sardines 0.36 0.32 0.38 0.39
Tomatoes 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.60
Salt 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.55
Coconut 0.89 0.76 0.76 0.67
Maize 10.22 11.27 9.02 11.23
Sweet Bananas 0.40 0.47 0.35 0.45
Cassava 3.50 2.79 3.15 3.23
Soap 2.05 2.22 2.18 2.41
Charcoal 2.09 2.01 2.02 2.10
Milling 8.57 8.29 7.71 10.03
Matches 1.98 1.78 1.90 2.26
Cigarettes 4.83 4.34 5.90 5.34
Sugar 0.51 0.48 0.51 0.63
Flour 1.38 1.28 1.18 1.27
Rice 1.68 1.57 1.61 1.64
Beans 0.88 0.93 0.82 0.79
Tea 0.67 0.77 0.74 0.78
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. See Table 1 for units. Items
ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from column 7 in Table 9.
a household have to delay purchasing an item in order to buy it at the lowest available
unit price (which it could then do in perpetuity)? In other words, for how long would
a household need to forego consumption in order to overcome a liquidity constraint? Let
ahi ≡ eˆhi/14 be the average daily expenditure on item i by household h, and recall that
e∗min is the minimum expenditure required to buy item i at the lowest focal unit price. The
self-financed purchasing delay is then dhi = e
∗
min/ahi. We calculate dhi for all household-item
pairs in which the household makes at least one transaction.13 This is a very conservative
approach, because it ignores the fact that households could also shift spending between
items, and might be able to access some credit to finance the initial bulk purchase.
In the upper panel of Table 13, we report the item-level median value of dhi for all
households (column 1), by wealth quartile (columns 2-5), and for the three groups of loss
13Note that including household-item pairs with only one transaction will tend to make these numbers
larger because this will include someone who is just dabbling—i.e., someone who makes one small quantity
purchase will have a high value of dhi.
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Table 13: Median days required to save enough to purchase at lowest unit price
All By wealth quartile (1 = poorest) Loss-prone HHs as measured by...
1 2 3 4
%age
only
Level
only Both
Item (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Kerosene 14.0 17.8 14.0 14.0 10.1 19.9 7.8 13.4
Onions 4.7 7.0 4.7 4.7 3.8 7.0 3.2 3.9
Cooking Bananas 11.9 14.0 14.0 12.0 9.3 24.1 9.3 8.0
Cooking Oil 8.1 12.8 11.4 9.8 3.9 15.0 4.2 7.2
Tea Leaves 7.9 7.0 14.0 14.0 5.8 35.0 4.5 16.3
Dried sardines 4.7 3.5 3.9 4.7 6.1 5.2 4.1 4.0
Tomatoes 3.1 4.7 4.7 3.5 1.7 4.7 1.7 2.5
Salt 8.6 7.0 7.0 8.8 11.7 11.7 7.8 8.8
Coconut 3.3 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.7 11.2 3.1 5.6
Maize 7.2 7.0 7.3 11.2 12.3 17.5 4.7 8.7
Sweet Bananas 8.4 10.5 16.8 13.7 5.7 18.2 4.8 13.2
Cassava 5.3 4.7 3.5 3.5 9.0 6.1 8.1 5.7
Soap 4.7 6.2 3.5 3.5 7.0 7.0 3.5 3.5
Charcoal 2.0 14.0 9.9 3.9 1.9 12.9 1.6 3.5
Milling 5.8 5.6 5.1 7.0 12.3 7.8 4.1 7.0
Matches 7.0 7.0 7.0 11.7 7.0 14.0 7.0 7.0
Cigarettes 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.2 0.5 3.5 0.5 1.3
Sugar 2.3 3.5 2.8 2.3 1.6 4.5 1.4 2.8
Flour 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 2.3 3.5 1.4 2.3
Rice 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.0 7.0 1.1 4.7
Beans 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.9 4.7 1.8 3.5
Tea 3.5 7.0 3.5 4.7 2.0 7.0 2.3 3.5
OVERALL 4.7 5.8 5.7 5.6 3.5 8.8 3.4 5.4
If household temporarily foregoes purchasing tea, tea leaves, salt, sugar, cigarettes, and matches:
Kerosene 4.2 5.8 4.4 4.2 3.1 7.9 2.3 4.6
Onions 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.6
Cooking Bananas 3.0 3.3 3.6 4.0 2.5 7.5 2.1 3.8
Cooking Oil 2.4 3.4 3.4 3.0 1.5 6.3 1.3 3.2
Dried sardines 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.7 0.5 0.9
Tomatoes 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.7
OVERALL 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.0 3.2 0.8 1.7
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Items ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from
Table 9. Column 6 includes households in highest quartile by L˜h but not Lh. Column 7 includes households
in highest quartile by Lh but not L˜h. Column 8 includes households in highest quartile by both.
prone households (columns 6–8). The most striking feature of Table 13 is that the median
delays are all relatively short. Virtually all are less than two weeks, and the majority are
less than one week. The wealthiest households have shorter delays, but the differences are
not substantial. The “Percentage-only” loss-prone households have the longest delays, with
an average of 8.8 days (column 6). We have already seen in Table 11 that these households
appear to be poor and disadvantaged on numerous dimensions. Hence, if liquidity constraints
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drive small-quantity purchasing for anyone, these households are the most likely candidates.
Yet, even for this group, the delays are short. If liquidity constraints are the only barrier
to high-quantity purchasing, then it hardly seems onerous to delay consuming an item for a
week or two, once, in order to consume more of it at lower cost forever afterwards.
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) investigate a related question for roadside vendors
in Chennai, India (p. 123-124). Those vendors lose roughly half of their daily earnings to
interest payments on short-term loans, and yet still buy a daily cup of tea. The authors
calculate that by foregoing tea for 50 days, the average vendor could save enough to perma-
nently avoid short- term borrowing, resulting in a doubling of take-home pay (and more tea
in perpetuity). In the lower panel of Table 13 we conduct a similar analysis to Mullainathan
and Shafir (2013), allowing for transfers between items. We re-calculate dhi for six high-loss
items under a counterfactual in which the household temporarily foregoes purchasing tea, tea
leaves, salt, sugar, cigarettes, and matches, and instead applies the cash spent on those items
to financing a bulk purchase. Here, we find far shorter delays than in the upper panel of the
table. The median delay for kerosene falls from 14 days to 4.2 days. For cooking oil, median
dhi falls from 8.1 to 2.4 days. Even among the poorest loss-prone households, in column 6,
median values of dhi range from 1.2–7.9 days. To believe that liquidity constraints prevent
these households from buying in bulk is to believe that never in the lifetime of the household
could its members survive if they went a few days without purchasing these items, so as to
facilitate purchasing in bulk (which they could then do in perpetuity, having overcome the
initial constraint).
From this evidence, we conclude that liquidity constraints are not a major driver of
small quantity purchasing. This is not to say we believe liquidity constraints are irrelevant
in other dimensions, e.g., in regard to investment or capital accumulation, or that liquid-
ity constraints might not matter in other populations. It is even possible that the above
analysis masks a binding liquidity constraint for a handful of households. However, based
on this evidence we think it is more likely that when casual observation suggests that a
household foregoes a bulk purchase because it lacks liquidity, some other mechanism is in
fact responsible.
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Table 14: Counterfactual change in number of transactions, if purchasing at lowest unit price
(1) (2) (3)
Subgroup Statistic
Actual
(Khi)
Counter-
factual
(K∗hi) Difference
All households Mean total transactions 38.0 61.3 23.3
Mean transactions per item 3.6 5.8 2.2
Loss-prone households, level only Mean total transactions 76.8 113.0 36.2
Mean transactions per item 5.4 8.0 2.6
Loss-prone households, %age only Mean total transactions 21.0 22.8 1.8
Mean transactions per item 2.4 2.6 0.2
Loss-prone households, both Mean total transactions 47.1 51.3 4.2
Mean transactions per item 4.0 4.3 0.4
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. “Level only” are in highest quartile by Lh, but not
L˜h; t“%age only” are in highest quartile by L˜h, but not Lh; “both” are highest quartile by Lh and L˜h.
5.1.2 Utility from shopping
Perhaps people make frequent, small-quantity purchases because there is a utility value
from shopping—e.g., from the socializing and community engagement that one enjoys in the
market. Given our knowledge of Tanzania, we doubt this mechanism plays much of a role
in leading people not to take advantage of bulk discounts. People can pass by shops and
markets without making purchases, and do so frequently. There is nothing to stop consumers
from visiting shops to socialize, but buying in bulk when they need to make a purchase.
The data also contradict this hypothesis. Even the households that incur the largest
losses could rearrange their purchase patterns to take greater advantage of bulk discounts
and make more purchases overall. To illustrate, define K∗hi ≡ eˆhi/e∗min. This is the coun-
terfactual number of separate transactions that household h could make on item i at the
lowest available unit price for that item. The actual number of transactions that household h
makes on item i, Khi, could be smaller or larger than K
∗
hi. For items with bulk discounts on
which the households makes frequent small purchases—in particular, purchases of quantities
smaller than q∗min—the household will have K
∗
hi < Khi. For items on which the household
typically purchases quantities larger than q∗min, the household will have K
∗
hi > Khi. For items
purchased in both small and large quantities, the ordering of K∗hi and Khi is ambiguous.
Table 14 shows the mean values of Khi, K
∗
hi, and the difference K
∗
hi − Khi for all
households and for the three groups of loss-prone households. The positive differences in
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column 3 indicate that the average household in all four groups could shop more while only
buying in bulk. The transaction counts are consistent with what we already know about
the loss subgroups (from Table 11). Households that are loss-prone in levels (only) accrue
their high losses by shopping a lot, making 76.8 transactions on average. However, these
loss-prone households could shop substantially more while paying the lowest unit price –
36.2 more transactions on average – if they eliminated transactions both below and above
q∗min. The next group, the high percentage loss group, are relatively poor and tend to shop
very little, which is reflected in their low level of average transactions (21). Yet, even this
group could make 0.2 more transactions per item, on average, while only purchasing in bulk.
Finally, households that are in the 25% worst group in both levels and percentages could
make 51.3 instead of 47.1 transactions if their goal was to shop as much as possible while
never paying more than the lowest available unit price.
Table 14 does not show the between-item variation in K∗hij and Khi.
14 There are some
high-loss items that would have to be purchased less often by all groups (kerosene stands
out). On net, however, the potential increases in transactions for most items outweigh the
required cutbacks in others.
These counterfactual shopping patterns are unlikely to be optimal for a variety of
reasons. However, what this analysis clearly demonstrates is that the desire to shop fre-
quently cannot explain the failure to take advantage of bulk discounts, because households
could already do more of both.
5.1.3 Costs of transporting or storing bulk purchases
In wealthy countries, limitations on transport or storage space can be a binding constraint on
bulk purchasing (Griffith et al., 2009). A household cannot buy a carton of paper towels at a
big box store if it has no way to transport and store such a large purchase. In our data, the
situation is not so extreme. The bulk discounts in our study are available at relatively small
quantities, almost all of which can easily be transported and stored in a typical household.
In Table 10 we explicitly test for a relationship between distance from the community
center (which proxies for distance to market, and hence transport costs) and bulking losses.
Conditional on wealth, household size, and various measures of human capital, we find
14See online appendix Table A.2 for the item-level breakdown underlying Table 14.
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that bulking losses are slightly decreasing in distance (columns 2 and 4). This is a strong
indication that transport costs deter households from purchasing in bulk.
A second argument against this hypothesis is that the minimum quantities required
to reach the lowest unit price are simply too small to introduce transport problems. Consider
the staple items that are responsible for the largest share of losses and that are purchased by
the majority of households: kerosene, cooking oil, onions, dried sardines, and tomatoes. In
Table 6 we see that the maximum value (across the seven districts) of the minimum quantity
required to reach the lowest unit price is 1 liter for kerosene, 1 liter for cooking oil, 0.5 kg
for sardines, 1.4 kg for tomatoes, and 1.4 kg for onions (column 4). For households in the
other 6 districts, the minimum quantities are substantially smaller. Also, nothing about the
counterfactual purchasing patterns that we estimate in Section 4 requires that households
purchase and transport all of the bulk goods at once. Out of the 14 observation days, the
mean household reports at least one purchase on 11 separate days (median = 12). And
we saw in the previous subsection that households could actually increase the number of
purchases that they make while only buying in bulk. Hence, even though the total weight
and volume of most bulk purchases could be easily managed in a single shopping trip, such
purchases could also be spread over separate transactions and days to facilitate transport in
a way that would not require additional shopping trips.
A similar line of reasoning makes it unlikely that households avoid bulk purchasing
because of concerns about theft or depreciation of stocks. Table 6 and Figure 3 show that
“bulk” purchases in our data are still relatively small quantities, unlikely to be stored long
enough to depreciate. The technologies to store small quantities goods securely for a short
period – plastic bins with sealed lids, used jerry cans with screw tops, used plastic water
bottles with screw tops – are widely available and inexpensive. This conclusion is supported
by recent research on the depreciation rate of stored goods in sub-Saharan Africa. A report
from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on food waste
shows that post-consumer losses in sub-Saharan Africa for a wide range of commodities –
grains, roots, tubers, pulses, fruit, vegetables, meat, and seafood – are the lowest in the
world, ranging from 0–2% (Gustavsson et al., 2011). Other work looking at the depreciation
rate of crops stored by farmers post-harvest – primarily dried grains that spoil no faster than
the majority of items in our study – finds depreciation rates over the course of half a year
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or longer to be on the order of 1-5% in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda (Kaminski
and Christiaensen (2014); University of Ghana (2008), as cited in Zorya et al. (2011)).
We cannot rule out that for some household with extremely dire living conditions, the
possibility of storage depreciation over even a few days deters bulk purchasing. But there
is no evidence in our data nor in the literature to support the hypothesis that households
in Tanzania are deterred from buying slightly larger quantities of many items because they
worry about depreciation during a short period of storage.
5.1.4 Ignorance of bulk discounts
Is it possible that many people in Tanzania simply do not know of the available bulk dis-
counts? We are doubtful. When we conducted informal interviews with individuals in the
study area, everyone was well aware of bulk discounts for a wide range of consumption items.
Furthermore, our data suggest that many households personally experience the non-linear
prices. Column 2 of Table 4 shows the results of item-level regressions of unit price on
quantity, with household fixed effects. Even within household, bulk discounts show up. The
members of households that purchase items multiple times – exactly those that are foregoing
potential consumption – are surely aware of the available discounts.
5.2 Mechanisms consistent with the data
We next turn to mechanisms for which we find supporting evidence. These are: inattention
to the magnitude of forgone consumption, purchasing in small quantities as a form of self-
or other-control, avoidance of social taxation, and coordination costs within the household.
5.2.1 Inattention
In Section 5.1.4 we argued that ignorance of the available bulk discounts does not drive our
findings. But consumers could still be inattentive to the magnitude of the financial benefits
(or extra consumption) from taking greater advantage of bulk discounts, and, as a result, not
react to the existence of bulk discounts. To investigate this possibility, we exploit the fact
that households face some flat and some non-flat unit price schedules. In particular, for the
average study household, roughly 56% of observed purchases are of items with bulk discounts
41
in local markets, and 44% are of items with flat price schedules. Using this variation, we can
assess the extent to which households react to the existence of bulk discounts.
In order to implement this analysis across items, we use as the dependent variable
Khi, the number of transactions by household h for item i. In these regressions Khi proxies
for the size of the transaction. This is clearly imperfect, as there is a partly mechanical
relationship between losses and the number of transactions. But our interest here is in
comparing purchasing behavior on items with bulk discounts to purchasing behavior on
items without bulk discounts – and losses are zero, by construction, for items without bulk
discounts. Hence, there is nothing about the mechanical linkage between Khi and losses
that forces the results in this subsection. Furthermore, we include household fixed effects
in all regressions, so inference is based on within-household variation in the response to the
presence of bulk discounts for some items and not for others.
If a household is attending to the impact of bulk discounts, then, relative to purchase
patterns for goods with flat price schedules, the household should make fewer transactions—
that is, purchase larger quantities less frequently. In other words, one can think of behavior
on flat price schedules as reflective of baseline purchase patterns. We assess the extent to
which households adjust those patterns in reaction to bulk discounts.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 15 show the results of regressing Khi on a dummy variable
for whether the item exhibits bulk discounts (columns 3 and 4 are discussed in Section 5.2.2).
In column 1, we see that households make fewer purchases on items with bulk discounts.
Overall, households are attending to the existence of bulk discounts. However, column 2
investigates how this effect differs for the three categories of loss-prone households described
in Section 4.3. The message is somewhat different. The non-loss-prone households exhibit a
strong negative relationship between the number of transactions and the existence of bulk
discounts. In contrast, loss-prone households in group (i) (in levels only) and group (ii)
(in percentages only) exhibit no relationship between the number of transactions and the
existence of bulk discounts, as indicated by the F-tests listed in the lower panel of the table.
In other words, these households seem not to attend to the existence of bulk discounts.
Finally, loss-prone households in group (iii) (in both levels and percentages) actually
make 0.947 more transactions on items with bulk discounts (seen from summing coefficients
(a) and (d) in column 2). This result is surprising, although it does explain this group’s
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Table 15: Number of transactions and bulk discounts, household-item level
Dependent variable: number of transactions at household-item level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) Bulk discounts (=1) -0.275*** -0.666*** -0.662***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
(b) Bulk discounts × Highest quarter levels only (=1) 0.455*** 0.717***
(0.15) (0.20)
(c) Bulk discounts × Highest quarter %age only (=1) 0.827*** 0.602***
(0.15) (0.18)
(d) Bulk discounts × Highest quarter, both (=1) 1.619*** 1.361***
(0.19) (0.23)
(e) Temptation good (=1) 0.822*** 0.388***
(0.06) (0.11)
(f) Temptation × Bulk (=1) 0.423***
(0.15)
(g) Temptation × Highest quarter levels only (=1) 0.952***
(0.24)
(h) Temptation × Bulk × Highest qrtr. level only (=1) -0.488
(0.38)
(i) Temptation × Highest quarter %age only (=1) -0.482**
(0.22)
(j) Temptation × Bulk × Highest qrtr. %age only (=1) 0.187
(0.33)
(k) Temptation × Highest quarter, both (=1) 0.335
(0.28)
(l) Temptation × Bulk × Highest quarter, both (=1) 0.401
(0.38)
Observations 11068 11068 11068 11068
R2 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.35
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Item fixed effects Yes Yes No No
F test p-value: (a)+(b)=0 0.13 0.76
F test p-value: (a)+(c)=0 0.24 0.70
F test p-value: (a)+(d)=0 0.00 0.00
F test p-value: (a)+(f)=0 0.06
F test p-value: (f)+(h)=0 0.85
F test p-value: (f)+(j)=0 0.04
F test p-value: (f)+(l)=0 0.02
F test p-value: (e)+(g)=0 0.00
F test p-value: (e)+(i)=0 0.62
F test p-value: (e)+(k)=0 0.00
F test p-value: (a)+(b)+(f)+(h)=0 0.97
F test p-value: (a)+(c)+(f)+(j)=0 0.04
F test p-value: (a)+(d)+(f)+(l)=0 0.00
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at household level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1.
particularly large losses. One possible cause of this purchasing pattern would be an item-
level correlation between bulk discounts and some other characteristic that generates frequent
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purchases. We discuss one possibility, how tempting an item is, in the next subsection.
Overall, we conclude from the analysis in column 2 that inattention to the financial
implications of bulk discounts is an important driver of losses in our data. The low-loss
households react to bulk discounts; the high-loss households do not. The behavior of the loss-
prone households is consistent with other recent work on the lack of salience of total prices to
retail consumers (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009). Of course, it is possible that inattention
combines with other factors to drive households toward small quantity purchasing. We
consider this in Section 6.
5.2.2 Rationing consumption
Could it be that people avoid buying in bulk as a way to limit their consumption? For
instance, a sophisticated but present-biased agent would forego bulk purchasing in order to
prevent her future self from over-consuming (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).
Relatedly, the household shoppers may not trust other household members to control their
consumption, and so may limit stocks as a form of rationing. In focus group discussions, we
heard variations on this idea, one from a respondent in Bukoba that can be paraphrased as
follows: “We know that we need 1 kilogram of maize flour each evening. But if we buy a 50
kilogram bag of maize, we may find that it is gone at the end of one month, because we use
too much each day. So it is better to buy smaller amounts.”15
If rationing is present, it is most likely to occur on items that are “temptation goods”
– goods which, if held in stock, are likely to be consumed too quickly relative to one’s ex ante
plan. We can exploit between-item variation in the degree of “temptingness” to distinguish
inattention from rationing. Because temptation goods are culturally specific, we conducted
a short survey to rank the study items based on their degree of temptation. We invited
86 Tanzanian field staff members from recent research projects in the country – a panel of
experts on household decision-making in Tanzania – to rank each of the 21 consumer items
in the study on a five-point categorical scale from 1 (not at all tempting) to 5 (tempting
for essentially everyone who consumes the item).16 Respondents were asked to answer for a
15Despite this anecdote, neither maize nor maize flour were deemed to be “temptation goods” in our survey
(see next paragraph). This underscores the subjectivity of temptation and the importance of grounding this
analysis in survey data rather than in any one person’s perception of what is tempting.
16We excluded the one service in the study – milling of grains – because asking people to characterize
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typical household in a typical village, not to self-assess their own temptations. The survey
was conducted online in June-July 2016. We received 43 responses. We assign each item its
average score on the 5-point scale, and then refer to the top third (7 items) as the temptation
goods in the study. These are: sugar, rice, cooking oil, soap, tomatoes, cigarettes, and sweet
bananas.17
It is worth noting that there is very little correlation between a good having bulk
discounts and being classified as tempting. Across the 146 item-district pairs, the correla-
tion between the temptation dummy and the indicator for bulk discounts is −0.07. The
relationship is essentially unchanged if we control for district fixed effects.
We first investigate whether consumption rationing is in fact happening. As a simple
test, we ask whether people are prone to make more transactions for temptation goods,
consistent with a desire to not accumulate stocks at home. Specifically, we regress Khi on
whether an item is a temptation good while controlling for household fixed effects.18 In
column 3 of Table 15, we see that temptation seems to really matter, as households on
average make 0.82 more transanctions for a temptation good. In other words, households
indeed seem to engage in consumption rationing for temptation goods.
We next investigate whether consumption rationing is driving losses. Specifically, we
ask whether there is more consumption rationing for the loss-prone households, which would
indicate that the impact of a good being tempting is larger for that group. We also assess
whether the relationship between transactions and the existence of bulk discounts (as studied
in Section 5.2.1) differs for temptation goods. We are interested in whether the tendency of
loss-prone households not to react to bulk discounts could in part be driven by temptation.
Column 4 of Table 15 presents the results. As in column 2, the non-loss-prone house-
holds exhibit a strong negative relationship between the number of transactions and the
existence of bulk discounts (coefficient (a)), but note that this relationship is weaker for
temptation goods (coefficients (a)+(f)). Households with low losses are attending to bulk
milling as tempting or not made no sense during piloting.
17The full ranking and average scores from the temptation survey are shown in online appendix Table A.3.
18We cannot also control for item fixed effects in these regressions. However, if we exclude the temptation
dummy variable and include item fixed effects, estimates are broadly similar, indicating that “temptingness”
is not conditionally correlated with other unobserved item characteristics that explain variation in Khi.
Likewise, the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 15 are qualitatively unchanged if we exclude item fixed
effects.
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discounts, but also adjusting their behavior to accommodate temptation.
Relative to the other groups, loss-prone households in group (i) (in levels only) demon-
strate a strong relationship between temptation and the number of transactions (coefficients
(e)+(g)). At the same time, temptation does not alter the relationship between the number
of transactions and the existence of bulk discounts for this group. In particular, for both
non-temptation goods and temptation goods, this group’s purchase patterns are the same
whether or not there are bulk discounts (as seen by the fact that coefficients (a)+(b) and
coefficients (a)+(b)+(f)+(h) both sum to roughly zero). This pattern of results is consis-
tent with these households being inattentive to bulk discounts while making smaller more
frequent purchases for temptation goods. Together, this yields losses on temptation goods.
Loss-prone households in group (ii) (in percentages only) are in fact not influenced
by temptation (coefficients (e)+(i)). We know from above that these households are poor,
and shop far less than the other groups. While these households are not influenced by bulk
discounts for non-tempting goods, for tempting goods they have more transactions when
there are bulk discounts (coefficients (a)+(c)+(f)+(j)). That is, they exhibit the surprising
pattern that we saw for group (iii) in the previous subsection (in column 2).
Finally, loss-prone households in group (iii) (in both levels and percentages) are influ-
enced mildly by temptation (coefficients (e)+(k)). Moreover, they again exhibit the surpris-
ing pattern of having more transactions when there are bulk discounts (coefficients (a)+(d)),
and this pattern is even stronger for temptation goods (coefficients (a)+(d)+(f)+(l)).
Overall, these results suggest that consumption rationing might play a role in gen-
erating losses. The evidence strongly suggests that consumption rationing is occurring for
tempation goods. Moreover, the loss-prone households are inattentive to the financial con-
sequences of this consumption rationing—and for groups (ii) and (iii) bulk discounts are
associated with even more transactions for temptation goods. All that said, it is not the
case that losses are concentrated on the temptation goods. For the three loss-prone types,
losses on the temptation goods are only 38%, 33%, and 41% of total losses. Hence, con-
sumption rationing can be at most part of the story.
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5.2.3 Social taxation
In many communities in sub-Saharan Africa, requests by non-household members for gifts,
shared meals, or loans – which we refer to as “social taxes” – are a key part of life (Platteau,
2014). Recent experimental work has shown that participants’ willingness to share windfall
gains with others is related in part to the visibility of those gains, suggesting social pressure
in favor of redistribution (Goldberg, 2016; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016). Similarly, Baland,
Guirkinger and Mali (2011) show in a sample from Cameroon that nearly 1 in 5 people who
take out a loan from a savings group do not technically need that loan. These borrowers have
adequate cash savings to cover the loan value, but they take out an interest-bearing loan to
send a credible signal of poverty to their friends and family, in order to deter requests for
handouts. Likewise, De Weerdt, Genicot and Mesnard (2015) show that a transfer recipient’s
perception of a donor’s wealth affects the the value of the transfer between them, conditional
on the donor’s actual wealth. This indicates that pressure from transfer recipients is an
important factor in determining patterns of social insurance and redistribution.19
In light of this evidence, a natural hypothesis is that a household might choose not
to buy in bulk, despite financial losses, in order to avoid paying social taxes on their store of
goods. In support of this mechanism, we present evidence on three points. First, we show
that households are indeed subject to social taxes. Second, we show that the social tax rate
is higher for those who buy in bulk. Finally, we assess whether households respond to this
by reducing their purchase quantities and foregoing bulk discounts. For the final point we
rely on anecdotal evidence.
On the first point, the data allow us to directly observe a proxy for social taxes. In
addition to the purchase transactions records, diary keepers also recorded the item descrip-
tion, quantity, unit, and value of any item sold or given away from the household stores. To
estimate the household-level social tax rate, we divide the total value of outgoing resources
by the total value of incoming resources for the two-week study period. This is not an exact
measure of the household’s social tax rate; the outgoing data include a small number of
19Because the asset in question is a stock of food that can be immediately converted to a consumption good,
our measure of social taxes could also be interpreted as a measure of consumption coinsurance (Townsend,
1994; Ligon, 1998; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Kinnan, 2011; Chandrasekhar,
Kinnan and Larreguy, 2014). We frame the issue as one of taxes because the behavior of interest is the
decision to not buy in bulk, i.e., to forego an investment.
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sales, which may inflate our measure of social tax rates, and measurement error could induce
bias in either direction. Yet, to our knowledge this is the first proxy of social taxes in the
literature that is based on diary records of resource flows into and out of the household.
Table 16: Social taxation, descriptive statistics
Category Mean s.d.
Total value outgoing (TZS) 7982 22567
outgoing: meals and snacks 3028 9526
outgoing: grains 1488 6330
outgoing: pulses and nuts 1414 7449
outgoing: starches 413 2529
outgoing: meat and dairy 260 1406
outgoing: fruits and vegetables 83 769
outgoing: other 1296 10175
Total value incoming (TZS) 72941 101056
incoming: purchases 51184 95335
incoming: own production 15322 24008
incoming: other 6435 11058
Implied social tax rate (%) 12.4 26.1
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Estimates based on all activity
by the 1,499 diary households, on all items. Figures are the total TZS values of each
outgoing or incoming transaction reported in transaction diaries for the categories
listed, aggregated to the household-category level by the authors.
Table 16 shows descriptive statistics for the components of incoming and outgoing
resources. The uppermost panel shows the value of resources outgoing in the form of sales or
gifts, divided into sub-categories. The most important sub-category is “meals and snacks”,
which accounts for 40% of outgoing resource flows. Almost all of these are described as a
“full meal” – a guest at the household table (this level of detail not shown). The lower
part of the table shows the value of incoming resources. Because we are using these data
to characterize households rather than to study purchase behavior, we include all items in
the incoming and outgoing measures, not just the 22 items under consideration in the rest
of the paper. The mean tax rate is 12.4%, and the median is 2.9%. These descriptive data
provide evidence on the first point: social taxes plainly exist and are a common feature of
life, although there is significant heterogeneity between households in the social tax rate.
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We next ask whether buying in bulk is associated with a higher social tax rate. As a
proxy for (not) buying in bulk, we use a household’s total losses Lh, where a smaller Lh is
associated with more bulk buying. For robustness, we also estimate models with percentage
losses, L˜h, as the proxy for not buying in bulk. Table 17 shows the results of regressions of the
household social tax rate on Lh or L˜h, with and without controls for wealth, demographics,
location, and human capital.20 The coefficients of interest, on Lh and L˜h, are stable and
highly statistically significant across specifications. Because losses are decreasing in bulk
purchasing, the negative signs are consistent with the proposed hypothesis: conditional
on other characteristics, households that buy in bulk pay higher social tax rates. The
magnitudes are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in Lh (about
935 TZS for the estimation sample) is associated with a tax rate change of -2.06 percentage
points, or 17% of the mean. Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in L˜h (about 0.066)
is associated with a tax rate change of -1.46 percentage points, or 12% of the mean.
Of course, the results in Table 17 merely establish correlation, not that buying in
bulk causes households to pay higher social taxes. It is possible that the households that
pay higher social taxes for unobserved reasons buy in bulk in order to accommodate the
expected requests. However, such reverse causation would contradict the evidence discussed
above showing that social tax rates respond to changes in visible resources. Moreover, a
second key finding in Table 17 is that social tax rates do not meaningfully co-move with
important observable household characteristics, such as wealth, size, and location. We find
this surprising. Yet, this result lends support to the idea that social tax rates are not
exclusively determined by time invariant household characteristics, but respond to observable
resources such as the household stocks on hand.
Finally, we assess whether fear of paying social taxes might be the reason for incurring
losses by not buying in bulk. On this point we rely on anecdotal evidence from our qualitative
work. The case was stated most eloquently by someone we interviewed in the Kagera region:
“If I buy 5 kilograms of sugar, everyone will take their tea at my house.” We heard variations
on this idea from other people. Buying small quantities – or, at least, not buying very large
quantities – can be a useful way to deter requests from one’s social network. Even if goods
20Results are similar if we use a Tobit estimator to account for the roughly 35% of households with an
estimated zero tax rate. See online appendix Table A.4.
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Table 17: Household-level social tax rate regressed on losses and household characteristics
Dependent variable: household-level social tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lh -0.0021*** -0.0022***
(0.0007) (0.0008)
L˜h -20.6654** -22.0560**
(9.0284) (9.3974)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 1.7832 1.3782
(2.1914) (2.1465)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 2.4235 1.8586
(2.0651) (2.0382)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 2.0468 0.7097
(2.9586) (2.8818)
Household size 0.0079 -0.1438
(0.2715) (0.2720)
Age of head (years) -0.0118 -0.0099
(0.0506) (0.0504)
Head is female (=1) 1.4034 1.3932
(1.7317) (1.7450)
Distance to center of community (km) -0.2208 -0.1607
(0.7283) (0.7189)
Observations 1472 1465 1472 1465
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects and controls for questionnaire module.
can be stored privately so that explicit redistributive pressure is not a problem, people may
hold internalized norms in favor of sharing that which is available, which prevents them from
stocking too much of an item. The end result is that households incur losses on some items
for which they would otherwise pay a lower unit price.
This analysis raises the question of whether small quantity purchasing to avoid social
taxation is financially inefficient. We could attempt to answer this question by calculating
the counterfactual tax rate that households would pay if they purchased in bulk, and refining
our measure of Lh accordingly. We opted not to do this, because such an exercise requires
estimating a parametric model relating social taxes to purchase quantities and household
characteristics. If social tax rates are influenced by unobserved household characteristics, as
they likely are, then such a model would be of little use for the out-of-sample predictions
required by the exercise. Given this inherent limitation, we prefer to simply emphasize that
foregoing bulk purchasing may be financially efficient for some households, because it saves
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them from paying higher social taxes. We discuss this more broadly in Section 6.
5.2.4 Coordination costs within the household
Finally, we examine the possibility that purchase of financially inefficient small quantities
could be driven by the challenge of coordinating purchases between household members.
We consider two types of coordination problems: the first related to dividing shopping
responsibilities between household members, the second to relationships between spouses.
To implement this analysis we need a measure of shopping coordination (or lack
thereof). As a proxy for uncoordinated shopping, we use the number of days on which
multiple household members purchase the same item. This measures the key behavior of
interest, because households that do not coordinate incur losses when two or more people
purchase quantities of an item that would have cost less, total, if purchased all at once. For
these tests we use data from the 500 households that were randomly assigned to the “personal
diary” treatment. Each adult in these households completed his or her own transaction
diary, allowing us to observe which individual was responsible for each purchase. The modal
household has 2 personal diary keepers (54% of observations); the mean number of diary
keepers is 2.1, and the maximum is 7. For almost 40% of personal diary households, and for
half of those with more than one diary keeper, there is at least one instance of two or more
members buying the same good on the same day. Across all households, the mean number
of days with multiple purchasers of the same item is 1.06.
Table 18 shows results of regressing losses at the household level on the multiple-
purchaser variable and key control variables. Results are shown for all households in the
personal diary treatment as well as only for those households with multiple diary-keepers,
and for both level and percentage losses. In column 1 we see that the level value of losses
is increasing in the degree of un-coordinated shopping. Each additional day on which more
than one person buys the same item is associated with 68 TZS higher losses. This result
is essentially unchanged if we restrict attention to households with multiple diary-keepers
(column 2). Importantly, these results hold while conditioning on household size. We expect
more frequent multiple-purchasing in larger households, because the costs of coordination
are increasing in the number of people to coordinate. We have already seen that losses are
conditionally increasing in household size (Table 10).
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Table 18: Loss regressed on number of days with multiple purchasers of same item
Households: All Multi-diary All Multi-diary
Dependent variable: Loss Loss % Loss % Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of days 2+ people buy same item 67.505** 63.789** -0.001 -0.001
(28.26) (29.48) (0.00) (0.00)
Household size 42.287* 28.907 -0.001 -0.002
(21.87) (26.74) (0.00) (0.00)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 90.348 87.828 -0.005 -0.003
(114.58) (135.05) (0.01) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 74.841 70.731 -0.007 -0.007
(133.06) (152.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 183.368 73.947 -0.019 -0.014
(177.12) (211.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 495 381 495 381
R2 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.16
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects. Personal diaries only.
Columns 3 and 4 report estimates of similar regressions with L˜h as the dependent
variable. Here we see that there is no link between lack of coordination and percentage losses.
This is not surprising, as we already know that households with high percentage losses tend
to be smaller and to make many fewer purchases than average (Table 11).
A second type of coordination problem was repeatedly mentioned during our qualita-
tive work. The suggestion was that husbands in Tanzania ration the spending of their wives
by giving them daily allowances to purchase necessities, such as the components of the family
meal. The husband’s goals, according to interviewees, are to carefully guard the household
finances and to prevent the wife from spending money on items for herself. This mechanism
alone would not be sufficient to generate losses, because the wife could potentially save some
cash and delay purchasing certain items in order to buy goods in bulk. However, if such be-
havior would be perceived as a violation of the social contract between spouses, the personal
cost to the woman could be too high to justify saving up in order to bulk purchase.
This model of spousal control is difficult to test, because there are many unobserved
forces that could lead to gender differences in purchasing behavior. We can, however, use
the data from personal diaries to examine whether losses are overwhelmingly attributable
to women rather than men. For many items women do buy slightly smaller quantities than
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men, on average. Yet, if we treat each individual as an independent unit and calculate
the self-financed purchasing delay for each item that appears in each personal diary (as in
Table 13), the median days to efficient purchasing are 7.9 for women and 9.3 for men. This
suggests that financial losses are not attributable to small quantity purchasing by women
alone. Thus, while we cannot rule out that husbands impose short-term spending constraints
on their wives, we do not have evidence that this leads to the accrual of losses.
6 Discussion
The analysis in this paper has demonstrated the existence of significant bulk discounts in
Tanzanian markets, even at relatively low quantities. We have shown that some households
suffer substantial financial losses by not taking advantage of those bulk discounts. We have
further investigated a number of possible explanations for this behavior, rejecting some
mechanisms and presenting evidence in favor of others. In this section, we discuss some
broader implications of our findings, and conclude.
A clear implication of our analysis is that consumer behavior seems driven by multiple
mechanisms. Indeed, we would argue that our approach of allowing for and testing a range
of possible mechanisms yields a more complete picture of household behavior than if we
had focused on identifying one particular mechanism. Moreover, there are likely to be some
interactions between these mechanisms. Most notably, while inattention by itself can lead
to a failure to take advantage of bulk discounts, it is perhaps more important as an enabling
mechanism that “multiplies” the impact of other mechanisms. Self-rationing, avoidance of
social taxation, and coordination problems all create a clear reason to buy more frequently
and in smaller quantities. If a household attends to the impact of bulk discounts, it will
weigh the benefits of purchasing in smaller quantities against the financial cost of forgoing
bulk discounts. But inattention can render a household particularly prone to losses.
A related point is that there is no reason to believe that a single mechanism or
constellation of mechanisms should serve to explain the behavior of all households. Our
analysis clearly indicates the existence of heterogeneity in households. At one level, we see
significant heterogeneity across households in terms of losses incurred. At a second level,
even among the loss-prone households, we see different types—e.g., the households who are
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in the top quartile of level losses but not in the top quartile of percentage losses appear
to be very wealthy households, whereas those who are in the top quartile of percentage
losses but not level losses appear to be very poor households. Finally, we see evidence that
households are impacted differentially by the various mechanisms—e.g., in Table 15 we see
that the wealthy loss-prone households seem especially influenced by temptation, while the
poor loss-prone households seem not to be influenced by temptation.
Each of the four mechanisms implicated by our analysis represents a natural response
to some constraint faced by the shopper. Inattention to bulk discounts is a natural response
to the cognitive cost of figuring out the financial implications. Limiting stocks is a natural
response to avoid inefficient over-consumption by one’s future self or by other household
members, and to the social taxes that emerge from longstanding traditions of meal-sharing
and coinsurance in village communities. And limiting purchases to avoid excessive total
household purchases is a natural response to coordination issues. Of course, the big question
is whether households are responding optimally to these other constraints. Our data do not
permit us to explicitly address this question. Yet, given the magnitude of the financial costs,
we find it hard to believe that this behavior could be fully optimal, especially for inattention.
Our finding that households in Tanzania appear to forego potential gains in con-
sumption by not buying in bulk should clearly be of interest to policymakers and consumer
advocates. Given our analysis, are there policy interventions that might make consumers
better off by helping them to take more advantage of bulk discounts? The answer depends
on the mechanism. Perhaps most promising would be interventions designed to make bulk
discounts more salient, or otherwise help households to better understand the full financial
implications of not buying in bulk. But one could also imagine interventions designed to
help people better manage their consumption of stocks, both within the household and with
neighbors, or interventions designed to better manage the coordination of household pur-
chases. Indeed, on the last point, we wonder whether the dramatic increase in cell phone use
in Tanzania since the study period may have already had a significant impact by lowering
the costs of coordination. For all such interventions, however, one must not ignore that
reductions in small-quantity purchasing could lead to negative supply-side responses and
resulting general equilibrium effects (which we cannot investigate with these data).
Finally, we conclude by reiterating our general contribution of describing and quan-
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tifying from a new angle an important feature of life in a low-income country. Spending
time in villages in Tanzania or similar countries, one cannot help but notice the frequency of
small quantity transactions at kiosks, shops, markets, and roadside stands. We examine the
financial implications of this way of making purchases, and provide evidence on numerous
hypotheses for why people might arrange their spending this way. We find strong evidence
against the ”poor pay more” hypothesis, calling into question some current wisdom about
how inequities may persist or be exacerbated by differential access to bulk discounts. We
also find a combination of external and internal forces that rationalize the observed purchas-
ing patterns. In this regard, we believe that our paper makes a novel contribution toward
understanding the micro-foundations of consumer choice in developing economies.
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A Appendix — For online publication only
Table A.1: Regressions of expenditure on quantity and its square
Dependent variable: transaction-level expenditure
Coefficient on q2
Item
point
estimate
standard
error
Rice -1.33 (4.47)
Maize -1.22 (0.73)
Flour -22.14** (6.11)
Milling -0.06 (0.23)
Cassava 0.31 (2.98)
Cooking Bananas -2.83 (1.81)
Sugar -16.61 (8.87)
Beans -0.10 (7.51)
Coconut -14.58 (18.14)
Tomatoes -69.10 (42.87)
Onions -60.72 (51.09)
Sweet Bananas -78.50** (26.41)
Dried sardines -237.81*** (60.52)
Cooking Oil -407.26*** (109.55)
Salt -17.32 (33.65)
Tea -13.19** (4.53)
Tea Leaves -6806.18*** (803.50)
Charcoal -9.26** (2.68)
Kerosene -240.55*** (47.57)
Matches -1.03*** (0.18)
Soap -4.92*** (0.52)
Cigarettes -0.06 (0.03)
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses;
standard errors clustered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at
0.1. Each coefficient is from a separate regression of transaction-level expenditure on
quantity and quantity squared, for only the item indicated. We report the coefficient
on quantity squared.
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Table A.2: Counterfactual change in num. of transactions, if purchasing at lowest unit price
Subgroup: 25% highest loss, level only 25% highest loss, %age only 25% highest loss, both
Item
Mean
Khi
Mean
K∗hi
Mean
diff.
Mean
Khi
Mean
K∗hi
Mean
diff.
Mean
Khi
Mean
K∗hi
Mean
diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Kerosene 5.5 1.8 -3.7 3.0 0.9 -2.1 4.7 1.3 -3.4
Onions 5.6 4.8 -0.8 2.3 2.3 0.0 4.5 4.1 -0.4
Cooking Bananas 3.0 2.2 -0.8 1.9 1.0 -0.9 3.7 2.2 -1.5
Cooking Oil 7.1 4.6 -2.6 3.2 2.0 -1.3 6.6 3.0 -3.6
Tea Leaves 5.1 4.9 -0.2 1.5 0.7 -0.8 3.5 1.5 -2.0
Dried sardines 3.8 5.6 1.8 3.3 3.8 0.5 4.2 5.1 0.9
Tomatoes 7.1 8.0 0.9 3.2 3.5 0.4 6.2 6.3 0.1
Salt 2.4 2.2 -0.1 1.8 1.5 -0.3 2.3 1.9 -0.4
Coconut 6.1 4.7 -1.4 2.0 1.5 -0.5 3.8 2.5 -1.3
Maize 3.2 2.7 -0.6 1.3 1.6 0.3 3.5 2.0 -1.5
Sweet Bananas 3.0 5.0 2.0 1.4 2.0 0.6 2.4 4.2 1.8
Cassava 2.3 4.4 2.1 2.0 4.5 2.6 1.9 5.1 3.2
Soap 3.9 5.9 2.0 2.3 2.8 0.5 3.3 4.9 1.6
Charcoal 7.5 9.9 2.4 3.0 1.9 -1.1 5.9 5.9 0.1
Milling 3.1 4.7 1.6 1.9 2.6 0.6 3.4 3.8 0.4
Matches 2.4 3.5 1.1 1.8 1.8 -0.0 2.3 3.3 1.0
Cigarettes 7.1 29.4 22.3 3.5 6.1 2.6 5.9 15.1 9.2
Sugar 5.6 9.9 4.3 2.0 3.6 1.6 3.7 6.0 2.3
Flour 7.4 17.3 9.9 2.5 6.4 3.9 4.1 10.7 6.6
Rice 4.8 12.0 7.2 1.4 2.7 1.4 2.9 5.2 2.3
Beans 3.2 7.7 4.5 1.4 3.5 2.1 2.5 5.0 2.5
Tea 4.9 7.3 2.4 1.8 3.1 1.3 3.8 6.4 2.6
AVERAGE 5.4 8.0 2.6 2.4 2.6 0.2 4.0 4.3 0.4
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Items ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from
column 7 in Table 9.
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Table A.3: Temptation survey results (1 = Not tempting; 5 = Highly tempting)
Item
Mean
score
Tea leaves 2.31
Maize 2.33
Cassava 2.43
Kerosene 2.54
Sardines 2.74
Salt 2.79
Matches 2.81
Coconut 2.88
Cooking bananas 3.00
Onions 3.00
Flour 3.02
Beans 3.02
Prepared tea 3.15
Charcoal 3.19
Sweet bananas 3.38
Cigarettes 3.81
Soap 3.83
Tomato 3.83
Cooking oil 3.85
Rice 4.29
Sugar 4.31
Notes: Authors’ calculations from survey conducted with 43 Tan-
zanians.
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Table A.4: Household-level social tax rate regressed on losses, Tobit
Dependent variable: Estimated household-level social tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lh -0.0022** -0.0024**
(0.0011) (0.0012)
L˜h -26.7382* -25.8822*
(14.1943) (14.5389)
Wealth index quartile 2 (=1) 1.1341 0.6754
(2.6910) (2.6420)
Wealth index quartile 3 (=1) 2.5567 1.9555
(2.5476) (2.5404)
Wealth index quartile 4 (=1) 1.4114 -0.0130
(3.8607) (3.7960)
Household size 0.4074 0.2495
(0.3631) (0.3622)
Age of head (years) -0.0464 -0.0440
(0.0725) (0.0721)
Head is female (=1) 0.5871 0.5962
(2.5705) (2.5959)
Distance to center of community (km) 0.4028 0.4775
(1.0403) (1.0360)
Observations 1472 1465 1472 1465
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects and controls for questionnaire module.
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A.1 Using expenditure rather than assets to measure wealth
In the main body of the paper, we use an index based on ownership of durable assets and
dwelling characteristics to measure household wealth. We use assets rather than expenditure
because the latter is a function of quantities and prices, and is therefore endogenous to
bulk discounts. One possible concern with this approach is that a stock measure based on
durables does not adequately capture the dimension of heterogeneity that is most relevant
for purchasing behavior, i.e., heterogeneity in income or liquid wealth. We are not concerned
about this. The wealth index is strongly correlated with observed household expenditure
(r = 0.55), and the literature establishing the use of asset indexes in development economics
argues convincingly for their value as substitutes for income or expenditure data (Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001; Sahn and Stifel, 2003). Additionally, because the level of liquidity required
to access bulk discounts is very modest in most instances, it is likely that the asset-wealthy
households – those that have concrete floors, or tin roofs, or large livestock holdings – will
have various ways to access e∗min TZS if desired.
Nevertheless, for concerned readers, in this subsection we provide results using quar-
tiles of observed expenditure instead of quartiles of the asset index. Tables X-Z are exactly
analogous to the indicated tables in the main body of the paper. In all cases, the nature of
the findings based on expenditure is qualitatively identical to that based on the asset index.
Where there are small differences, they reflect the endogeneity that motivated our use of
assets in the first place. For example, in Table A.6, it is mechanical that the idiosyncratic
component of prices is increasing in expenditure over some range, because idiosyncratically
higher unit prices are partially responsible for higher observed expenditure (other things
equal).
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Table A.5: Loss regressed on household characteristics - as in Table 10
Dependent variable: Loss Loss % Loss % Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expenditure quartile 2 (=1) 229.112*** 235.625** -0.011 -0.012
(60.027) (69.307) (0.009) (0.010)
Expenditure quartile 3 (=1) 595.542*** 604.931*** -0.018 -0.019*
(111.530) (115.639) (0.010) (0.010)
Expenditure quartile 4 (=1) 594.433*** 608.216*** -0.042*** -0.043***
(73.220) (81.669) (0.010) (0.009)
Age of head (years) -4.540 -0.001**
(2.355) (0.000)
Head is female (=1) 57.561 0.001
(87.711) (0.005)
Head years of education -10.604 -0.000
(13.794) (0.001)
Household size 40.301 -0.002
(32.723) (0.002)
Distance to community center (km) -97.817 -0.005**
(65.775) (0.002)
Observations 1472 1466 1472 1466
R-squared 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22
Mean dep. var. 839.952 836.798 0.069 0.069
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects, controls for demographic composition of the household, and controls for questionnaire module. The
expenditure index is defined with quartile 1, the excluded group, as the poorest.
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Table A.6: Regressions of idiosyncratic price component – as in Table 8
Dependent variable: νˆnhik |νˆnhik|
(1) (2)
Quantity z-score -0.039 -0.028
(0.02) (0.02)
Precise unit (=1) 0.105 0.112
(0.11) (0.10)
Market day purchase (=1) 0.016*** 0.009
(0.00) (0.01)
Expenditure quartile 2 (=1) 0.030 0.022
(0.02) (0.01)
Expenditure quartile 3 (=1) 0.054** 0.026
(0.02) (0.02)
Expenditure quartile 4 (=1) 0.130*** 0.085***
(0.02) (0.02)
Observations 53617 53617
R-squared 0.21 0.23
Mean of dep. variable 0.16 0.24
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at district level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects, item fixed effects, and controls for questionnaire module. Sample includes 1,496 households in 168
villages in 7 districts. We dropped observations in the 1% upper and lower tails of the νˆnhik distribution
before estimation.
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Table A.7: Average quantity per transaction - as in Table 12
Expenditure Quartile (1 = lowest)
Item 1 2 3 4
Kerosene 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.40
Onions 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.42
Cooking Bananas 6.98 9.78 6.34 7.49
Cooking Oil 0.10 0.12 0.17 0.28
Tea Leaves 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
Dried sardines 0.23 0.32 0.32 0.50
Tomatoes 0.45 0.47 0.55 0.69
Salt 0.42 0.44 0.49 0.63
Coconut 0.61 0.72 0.71 0.94
Maize 6.76 7.50 9.77 13.98
Sweet Bananas 0.24 0.42 0.25 0.57
Cassava 2.54 2.88 3.26 3.64
Soap 1.53 1.76 2.02 2.81
Charcoal 1.50 1.82 2.11 2.47
Milling 5.90 6.64 9.17 10.68
Matches 1.29 1.71 1.99 2.49
Cigarettes 4.36 4.49 4.84 6.32
Sugar 0.33 0.43 0.53 0.70
Flour 0.87 1.16 1.32 1.70
Rice 1.04 1.32 1.54 2.13
Beans 0.62 0.72 0.83 1.03
Tea 0.66 0.72 0.77 0.77
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. See Table 1 for units. Items
ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from column 7 in Table 9.
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Table A.8: Median days to self-finance the bulk purchase - as in Table 13
All By expenditure quartile (1 = lowest)
1 2 3 4
Item (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Kerosene 14.0 26.2 15.5 10.5 7.8
Onions 4.7 7.0 7.0 3.8 3.2
Cooking Bananas 11.9 14.0 14.0 12.0 7.0
Cooking Oil 8.1 20.5 12.4 7.0 3.4
Tea Leaves 7.9 14.4 9.6 8.9 6.1
Dried sardines 4.7 5.7 4.7 4.2 3.5
Tomatoes 3.1 7.0 4.7 2.5 1.8
Salt 8.6 14.0 7.8 7.8 7.0
Coconut 3.3 7.0 2.9 3.2 3.2
Maize 7.2 11.9 12.7 7.0 4.7
Sweet Bananas 8.4 14.0 14.0 10.4 5.7
Cassava 5.3 3.5 4.7 7.0 5.7
Soap 4.7 7.0 4.7 3.5 3.5
Charcoal 2.0 6.0 2.8 2.3 1.6
Milling 5.8 9.0 7.0 5.6 3.5
Matches 7.0 14.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Cigarettes 1.0 1.9 1.8 1.0 0.5
Sugar 2.3 4.7 2.8 2.0 1.4
Flour 1.6 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.8
Rice 2.3 5.3 3.5 2.0 0.9
Beans 3.5 4.7 3.8 3.5 1.8
Tea 3.5 7.0 4.7 3.5 2.3
OVERALL 4.7 8.4 6.8 4.7 3.4
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Items ordered by decreasing values of mean L˜h, from
Table 9.
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Table A.9: Household-level social tax rate as dependent variabl - as in Table 17
Dependent variable: household-level social tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lh -0.0021*** -0.0026***
(0.0007) (0.0008)
L˜h -20.6654** -17.1586*
(9.0284) (9.9423)
Expenditure quartile 2 (=1) 2.2115 1.4178
(2.2062) (2.1516)
Expenditure quartile 3 (=1) 4.4310* 2.5510
(2.3321) (2.2298)
Expenditure quartile 4 (=1) 6.8610*** 4.6383**
(2.1320) (2.0521)
Household size -0.3939 -0.4154
(0.3018) (0.3004)
Age of head (years) 0.0001 0.0027
(0.0507) (0.0513)
Head is female (=1) 1.8828 1.6914
(1.7626) (1.7791)
Distance to center of community (km) -0.2582 -0.1027
(0.7711) (0.7537)
Observations 1472 1466 1472 1466
R2 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects and controls for questionnaire module.
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Table A.10: Loss regressed on number of days with multiple purchasers - as in Table 18
Households: All Multi-diary All Multi-diary
Dependent variable: Loss Loss % Loss % Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of days 2+ people buy same item 55.589* 52.060* -0.000 0.000
(28.72) (30.26) (0.00) (0.00)
Household size 12.650 6.907 0.000 -0.000
(22.60) (26.43) (0.00) (0.00)
Expenditure quartile 2 (=1) 274.100*** 190.620* 0.003 -0.002
(85.87) (97.94) (0.01) (0.01)
Expenditure quartile 3 (=1) 683.564*** 646.658*** -0.003 -0.003
(124.11) (126.96) (0.01) (0.01)
Expenditure quartile 4 (=1) 574.826*** 539.296*** -0.026** -0.028**
(120.82) (122.17) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 495 381 495 381
R2 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.19
Notes: Authors’ calculations from SHWALITA data. Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clus-
tered at village level; *** sig. at 0.01, ** sig. at 0.05, * sig. at 0.1. All regressions include district fixed
effects. Personal diaries only.
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